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Abstract
Asset quality is an essential part of sound banking.  However, asset quality is difficult for banking
regulators and investors to assess in the absence of a common, cross-border scheme to classify assets.
Currently no standard is applied universally to classify loans, the most sizable asset on many banks’
balance sheets.  As a corollary, no common definition of non-performing loans (NPLs) exists.  This
paper documents divergences in the definition of NPLs across countries, accounting regimes, firms 
and data sources.  The paper’s originality is in attending to the legal, accounting, statistical, economic
and strategic aspects of loan loss provisioning (LLP) and NPLs, topics that are multidisciplinary by
nature but have not been dealt with in the literature in an integrated fashion before.  Since the 2007
Great Financial Crisis (GFC), accounting bodies and prudential regulators are increasingly focused on
early recognition of credit losses and enhanced disclosure.  A common approach to NPL recognition
might complement these initiatives.
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2 
On 16 November 2015, the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a joint statement following review 
of their economic assistance programme to Cyprus. In it, the three institutions noted that 
“reducing the excessive levels of NPLs [non-performing loans] remains the number one 
priority” for economic recovery in the country (European Commission, ECB and IMF 2015). 
Their statement underscores the central role NPLs have played in recent financial crises, 
including those in Cyprus and in Greece. According to data from The Banker database, which 
tracks banks in more than 190 jurisdictions representing 90 percent of the world’s total 
banking assets, six of the top ten banks when it comes to non-performing loans as a 
percentage of their overall gross loan portfolio are based in Greece or Cyprus.
1
 The 
prominence of NPLs in today’s crises is nothing new. On the contrary, NPLs are a recurring 
feature of economic and banking crises. Hence their definition, valuation, and mitigation are 
a crucial and enduring policy issue for central banks.  
At the most general level, a NPL is a loan where a borrower is not making 
repayments in accordance with contractual obligations. NPLs are impaired when the amount 
expected to be repaid falls below the contracted value carried on bank’s balance sheet. When 
this happens, loan loss provisions (LLPs) are made. LLPs are an accounting deduction. This 
accounting deduction amounts to the difference between the money borrowers from banks 
have agreed to repay, and banks’ most current estimate of the amount they will actually 
receive.
2
  
                                               
1
 These are the Bank of Cyprus (63%); Hellenic Bank (56.6%); Universal Savings Bank (44.5%); Piraeus Bank 
Group (38.8%); Eurobank Ergasias (33.4%); and Attica Bank (27.9%). 
2
 In some jurisdictions, the provision is shown as a separate line under the gross loan number; in others, there is 
or will be a disclosure requirements in the notes to the account to show the provision separately, even if loans 
are reported net on the balance sheet. The value in reporting loans gross and provisions separately is that it gives 
additional insight into the credit risk banks are running than if they were netted. If, for example, loans were only 
reported net of provisions, with no additional information, then there would be no way to discern from the 
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But beyond this general definition, the specific criteria for loans to be classed either 
as ‘impaired’ or as ‘non-performing’ vary across jurisdictions and firms, and within firms 
and across time. As a corollary, the threshold for impairment and provisions is different. This 
matters because it makes meaningfully comparing the quality of different banks’ assets 
difficult. There are also wider implications. Bad lending is the root of many banking crises. 
These in turn often induce wider economic contractions (European Central Bank 2013). So 
under-provisioning for loan losses can play a significant role in contributing to the creation of 
crises. And uncertainty about the definition of non-performance can exacerbate them because 
it makes it difficult for outsiders to decide whether recapitalisation and recovery of the firm 
can occur.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets out the reasons non-performing loans 
often feature in banking and economic crises, and why they are often obstacles to their 
resolution. In this section we review the existing economics literature on the significance of 
NPLs to bank solvency and systemic risk. A key economic consequence of insufficient LLPs 
and the persistence of NPLs on bank balance sheets is the combined threat of a ‘capital 
crunch’ with a ‘credit crunch.’ The Japanese ‘lost decades’ and the recent Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC) are cases in point (Alessandri and Haldane 2009; Hoshi and Kashyap 2009; 
Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap 2008; Peek and Rosengren 2005). Section 1 of the paper notes 
some of the challenges that the persistence of NPLs on bank balance sheets has posed post-
GFC. 
Section 2 of the paper shifts the level of analysis from macro to micro considerations. 
While early recognition and adequate provisioning for NPLs is ideal, several factors may 
                                                                                                                                                 
balance sheet a bank with £1 billion in loans with a large number of provisions and therefore poor ex-ante credit 
risk management, from a bank with a similar figure but few provisions and better credit risk management. 
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influence banks’ achievement of these in practice. These include their business model, how 
they have classified loans, and the tax treatment of provisions. There is also a trade-off 
between higher levels of provisioning, and higher levels of write-offs, and equity. In this 
section we note how the issue of LLPs relates to recent Basel III capital requirements and 
international financial reporting standards such as IFRS 9.
3
 
We think the trade-off between LLPs on the asset side of the balance sheet, and the 
equity of shareholders’ on the claims side, is particularly important. LLPs are often described 
as a bookkeeping entry for expected losses, while equity is often described as a residual 
buffer for creditors from unexpected losses.
 4
 However, LLPs and shareholders’ equity are 
more linked than these conventional descriptions of their different functions might imply. 
When provisions are made, the amount of assets on a bank’s balance sheet is reduced. What 
happens on one side of the balance sheet, impacts the other side. The consequence of a 
reduction in asset values is lower income in the period, which in turn leads to a reduction in 
shareholders’ equity. In the extreme, these losses can reduce shareholders’ equity below the 
minimum required of banks by regulators in order to operate. At the limit, it can cause 
insolvency, with losses to the bank’s creditors. Like a bank with non-performing loans on its 
books, these creditors may then find they are repaid less than the amount they contracted. It 
follows that the management of banks may be incentivised to lower the amount of provision 
charged, particularly when a bank is under stress. 
While higher ex-ante provisioning against expected loan losses when the external 
environment is relatively benign lowers bank profitability in the short term, over the long 
                                               
3
 This is the international accounting standard, effective from 2018, that governs loan loss provisioning. 
4
 This terminology from the Basel framework (see for instance paragraphs 12, 13 and 17 in the Basel II 
agreement) holds true regardless of the methodology of computation of LLPs: current accounting under  IFRS 
and US GAAP requires LLPs to reflect incurred losses, that is losses that a bank estimates it has already 
suffered on a loan, instead of the future losses it expects to suffer.   
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term it may reduce the need to raise equity during or after a crisis when it is more difficult to 
do so. Following Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) and Laeven and Majnoni (2003), who have 
argued that loan loss provisioning needs to be an integral component of banking regulation, 
we raise these issues because forward-looking provisioning is discussed less often in the 
scholarly literature on financial stability than bank capitalisation, though, as we note in the 
conclusion of this paper, both issues are now prominent items on the post-crisis regulatory 
agenda.  
Section 3 of our paper then scrutinises the definition of NPLs and the coherence of 
NPL data. In many jurisdictions and for many firms, an NPL is defined as a sum of borrowed 
money upon which the debtor has not made his or her scheduled payments for at least 90 
days. Generally, at some point after the debtor starts making payments again on an NPL it 
becomes a re-performing loan, in some cases even if the debtor has not caught up on all the 
missed payments. In a sense, an NPL is either in default or close to being in default 
(Cortavarria, Dziobek, Kanaya and Song 2000). However, the detailed definition of an NPL 
is not universal (Angklomkliew, George and Packer 2009). In this section and in the 
appendix we document this heterogeneity across regulatory jurisdictions, among global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and widely used commercial data sets. These 
differences complicate simple cross-country and cross-firm comparisons, and make accurate 
aggregation challenging, if not impossible.
5
   
One source of this variance is that detailed accounting standards in general are a 
relatively recent phenomenon, and, in particular, only in recent decades has there been 
                                               
5
 The heterogeneous valuation of non-performing loans has analogies in other areas of accounting. For example, 
different firms under different accounting regimes may value their inventory under different assumptions about 
which inventory has been sold and which inventory remains. Like differences in the valuation of impairments, 
differences in inventory cost-flow assumptions means that firms otherwise equal in performance may diverge in 
terms of their income in a given reporting period.  
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attempts to establish international accounting standards around the calculation of LLPs and, 
as supplementary disclosure, the classification of loans according to credit quality. 
Previously, even at a national level, there were few standards. In the US, the issue of FAS 5 
Accounting for Contingencies in 1975 was likely the first formalised accounting standard in 
this area. Before then, while banks did make provisions against bad loans, neither the extent 
of bad loans nor the level of provisions was public information. In the UK, for example, 
banks were, through custom and law, exempt from reporting the true nature of their 
provisions, profits, capital and NPLs until around 1970 (Billings and Capie 2009).  
Over time, the need for accounting standards and enhanced disclosures has increased 
because the nature of lending has become longer term. For example, in the UK, until the 
second half of the twentieth century, short-term loans constituted the vast majority of UK 
bank lending; fewer than 10 percent of banks’ loans to businesses between 1910 and 1914 
had a contractual term greater than a year, for example (Knott, Richardson, Rismanchi and 
Sen 2014). The development of longer-term lending, where banks assume more credit risk, 
increases the importance of having accurate and timely data to monitor asset quality through 
a loan’s long life.  
Section 4 of this paper therefore looks at the accounting treatment of non-performing 
loans and loan loss provisioning. Following the 2007 financial crisis, a number of voices at 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
expressed concern with the lack of international comparability of assets on banks’ balance 
sheets, and concern about delayed recognition of losses on assets. One specific criticism 
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voiced about pre-crisis accounting standards for provisions
6
 is that they operated on an 
incurred loss model. This meant that impairment was only recognised when a loss event 
occurred. Such a model is by design reactive and backward-looking. Indeed some critics 
have argued that it fuelled pro-cyclical lending and asset price bubbles ahead of the GFC 
because it meant loans were under-provisioned. In the aftermath of the GFC, there has been a 
growing chorus calling for a more forward-looking, ‘expected loss’ model. Here this shift in 
provisioning best practice from probable to possible losses can be read as reflecting a broader 
shift in the post-crisis regulatory paradigm from thinking about quantifiable risk to a concern 
with uncertainty.     
In many respects, the current debate about the value of forward-looking provisioning 
revisits an older difference of opinions between securities and banking regulators about the 
appropriate allowance for managerial judgement and discretion in the estimation of future 
losses (Camfferman 2015; Beatty and Liao 2011). Banking regulators often take the view 
that early provisioning is prudent. On the other hand, securities regulators, given their 
responsibility for ensuring the integrity of equity markets, typically have been concerned 
with banks using provisions as a means to reduce earnings volatility and therefore volatility 
in their share price in secondary markets. For example, in the UK, some banks historically 
use to overprovision for loan losses, creating so-called ‘hidden reserves’ (Billings and Capie 
2009). By doing so, these banks could deflate current period income in order to inflate it in a 
future period, offsetting other losses by writing the provision back to income as a means of 
smoothing returns to their shareholders. More recently, some commentators have suggested 
that firms including banks might overprovision in the first year when top management 
                                               
6
 At the time of writing, these standards are still in force under US GAAP and IFRS, but both standard-setters 
have committed to change. As this section concerns itself with initial reactions to the financial crisis, the past 
tense is used. 
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changes in order to show improved performance in later years (Higson 2012). Justifiable 
concern with these kinds of accounting policies contributed to the adoption of the ‘incurred 
loss’ model that dominated until the GFC.   
 We conclude that the early identification of, and provisioning against, problem loans, 
as well as greater transparency that ensures a better understanding by bank management, 
regulators, the market, and others of overall loan quality, are key in enabling the bank itself 
and external parties to understand where risk might be building up in bank balance sheets, 
and where necessary holding adequate capital or provisioning against them. This in turn can 
assist both in lowering the probability of bank crises, and in mitigating their effect when they 
arise.  
We note that, since the GFC, policymakers have reformed the framework around loan 
loss provisioning in order to enable earlier recognition of loss. However, the context around 
accounting provisions, including an understanding of how a loan portfolio is classified 
according to credit quality, is at least as important as the provisions themselves in 
understanding a bank’s overall health. We encourage further work by policymakers in this 
area to develop universally accepted criteria around how asset quality in banks is understood. 
 
1.  The systemic impact of NPLs  
This section takes its cue from Minsky’s (2008) schema regarding the seeds of 
financial and banking crises. Both Minsky and subsequent researchers have accumulated 
evidence showing that excessive credit growth and leverage often precede banking crises, 
signalled by a rapid growth in the rate of loans relative to deposits; that these lending booms 
lead to non-performing loans; and that NPLs are then major stumbling blocks to economic 
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recovery (Davis and Karim 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2005; Borio and Lowe 
2002; Demirgüç-Kunt 1989). A rise in the number of non-performing loans is bad news all 
round. As NPLs rise, so do the funding costs for banks with bad loans on their books. These 
costs often are then passed onto firms and households, potentially slowing economic growth 
as credit contracts (European Banking Coordination Vienna Initiative 2012).
 
In the extreme, 
systemic failures can occur when NPLs lead to bank and borrower insolvencies, with 
negative effects on third parties through direct inter-linkages, and indirect effects as asset 
prices decline in the course of liquidations
 
(USAID 2011), and overextended borrowers 
refrain from spending, reducing income down the line for others, including even for those 
that are not heavily indebted (Mehrling 2010).   
Factors in banking crises  
There are three common factors in banking crises that map onto the three components 
of balance sheets (assets, liabilities, and equity). The first factor is too little funding from 
equity to absorb losses. This is often termed the problem of excess leverage (a high ratio of 
total assets relative to equity). The second common factor is a high proportion of liabilities 
funded on a short-term basis in wholesale markets where liquidity can dry up quickly. This is 
often termed the problem of maturity mismatch and illiquidity (short-dated liabilities funding 
long-term assets). Finally, a third common factor in banking crises is a decline in the value of 
banks’ assets brought about by a chase for yield. On most banks’ books, this problem 
manifests itself as non-performing loans. 
In fact, the problem of non-performing loans and overall asset quality has played a 
central role in the models of financial instability proposed by many distinguished economists. 
Hyman Minksy, for example, argued that many banking crises have their root in declining 
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lending standards when banks seek to increase profits. According to Minsky, at some point in 
the lending cycle, a critical threshold is reached when the only way to accommodate further 
growth in assets is to allow the quality of those assets to decline. At this stage, the banking 
system transitions from cash flow banking, that is, banking proper, in which loans are made 
according to the value of the expected cash flow from productive investments, to collateral-
oriented banking—essentially pawn brokering—in which loans are granted based on the 
value of their underlying security (Minsky 1986). Asset quality then becomes dangerously 
susceptible to a decline in the price of the underlying collateral. And at the peak of lending 
booms just before they go bust, Minsky argued that some banks start to engage in Ponzi 
banking, granting loans that they are doubtful will be repaid, but are still originated because 
the loans can be sold. In the most recent crisis, this ‘Minsky moment’ took shape through the 
securitisation of loans and their sale to off-balance sheet conduits and special purpose 
vehicles (Wray 2011).  
 
Post GFC Trends in NPLs  
Table 1 presents data from the World Bank on the ratio of gross non-performing loans 
as a percentage of gross total loans (hereafter the NPL ratio) in various countries (Bloem and 
Gorte 2001). For reasons we discuss in detail below, these and any data on NPLs should be 
treated with caution because reporting countries compile these figures using different 
methodologies and definitions, and these also change over time (World Bank 2015).
 7
 With 
that caveat in mind, the data nevertheless indicate the direction of travel, a growing 
                                               
7
 It might also be argued that such a ratio rewards leverage, since a more leveraged bank would show a higher 
denominator and therefore a lower NPL ratio in situations where it has the same number of NPLs as a bank with 
lower leverage, even though overall risk of failure may be higher in a highly leveraged bank, since by definition 
it would have a lower capital buffer.  
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divergence in NPLs across countries that help explain differences in these economies’ recent 
performances, although causality runs both ways.
8
 
Initially, in 2007-09, with US banks having devoted about three quarters of their total 
loan portfolios to real estate lending (peaking at about $14.8 trillion in 2008 Q2), the largest 
percentage of NPLs came from this category of loans. In particular, large US bank holding 
companies with greater than $500 billion of assets reported a larger NPL ratio than other, 
smaller lending institutions. Their asset portfolio deteriorated through direct holdings of real 
estate loans, and through exposure to residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), and 
credit derivatives based on them (Markose, Giansante and Shaghaghi 2012). These assets 
                                               
8
 Even in countries often seen as having experienced a rather benign version of the GFC, NPLs have risen 
(King, Kitson, Konzelmann and Wilkinson 2012). For example, in Canada, NPLs have more than doubled in 
recent years (Allen, Boffey and Powell 2012).  
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Europe and the Baltics 9.5 7.0 3.9 3.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.8 6.4 10.0 12.3 13.8 11.6 8.2 
Cyprus 
        
3.6 4.5 5.8 10.0 18.4 38.6 45.4 
Denmark 0.5 0.7 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.2 3.3 4.1 3.7 6.0 4.6 4.5 
Euro area 3.7 2.9 3.0 2.5 2.3 1.8 1.3 1.8 2.8 4.8 5.4 6.0 7.5 7.9 8.3 
European Union 4.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.8 4.7 5.4 5.8 6.7 6.4 8.2 
EuroZone Periphery 4.9 3.3 3.7 3.6 4.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.8 6.6 8.0 11.0 16.3 22.1 22.6 
Finland 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 
  France 5.0 4.1 5.0 4.8 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.8 4.0 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.5 
 Germany 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.2 4.9 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7 
 Greece 12.3 5.6 7.4 7.0 7.0 6.3 5.4 4.6 4.7 7.0 9.1 14.4 23.3 31.9 34.3 
Iceland 1.5 1.2 2.6 2.1 0.9 1.1 0.8 
  
14.1 18.3 11.6 6.3 4.3 
 Ireland 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
 
0.5 0.5 0.6 1.9 9.8 13.0 16.1 25.0 25.7 18.7 
Italy 7.8 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.6 5.8 6.3 9.4 10.0 11.7 13.7 16.5 17.3 
Luxembourg 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 
 Netherlands 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.2 0.8 
 
1.7 3.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 
Norway 1.2 1.3 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 
OECD members 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.9 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 
Portugal 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.3 2.8 3.6 4.8 5.2 7.5 9.8 10.6 11.2 
Spain 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.7 6.0 7.5 9.4 8.5 
Sweden 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Switzerland 4.1 2.3 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 
 United Kingdom 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.6 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.7 
United States 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 3.0 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.5 2.0 
US BHS >$500bn# 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.0 3.0 7.2 6.7 5.5 5.3 4.5 
  
Table 1: Non-Performing Loan Ratios in Selected Countries  
Sources: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS/countries.  
              New York Fed: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/QuarterlyTrends2013Q2.pdf 
Ratio of bank non-performing loans to total gross loans is the value of non-performing loans (gross value of the loan as recorded on the balance sheet) expressed 
as a percentage of the total value of the loan portfolio (including non-performing loans before the deduction of loan loss provisions). US BHS >$500bn is the 
number of US Bank Holding Companies with assets greater than $500 billion according to the New York Fed. 
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also provided the channels for cross-border contagion (Allen, Boffey and Powell 2012).
 
Over the 
course of the crisis, Western European banks suffered large losses from impaired US RMBS 
(IMF 2009). In this respect, the current crisis is different from those faced by the Western world 
in the recent past that had external triggers, manifesting when balance of payment problems in 
developing countries resulted in non-performing loans on the balance sheets of big American and 
European banks.
9
   
 While those American and Western European banks with exposure to US RMBS 
experienced considerable asset quality deterioration in the initial phases of the GFC (Allen, 
Boffey and Powell 2012), NPL figures are now trending downward. By contrast, countries on the 
periphery of the Eurozone, and Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries 
are still experiencing very high levels of NPLs which have continued to increase in 2014/2015 
(Cavalier 2014; Skarica 2014; European Banking Coordination Vienna Initiative 2012; and Klein 
2013). From Table 1, we see that, for example, in Greece, the ratio of NPLs to total loans is 
estimated to have risen from 6.3 percent in 2005 to 34.3 percent in 2014.
 
 In Italy it has been 
estimated that the NPL ratio in 2014 was 17 percent of all loans totalling €160 billion (Jaussad 
and Kang 2015). In Romania and Serbia, the NPL figure has been quoted to be as high as 22 
percent, and it is estimated to be 15 percent in Croatia (Fitzgeorge-Parker 2014). In sum, NPLs 
remain elevated in double digits on the periphery of the Eurozone, where the financial crisis 
morphed into a sovereign debt crisis and the economies have experienced prolonged recession 
and austerity. In contrast, many have claimed that measures taken by authorities in the US, UK, 
and the core of the Eurozone have helped to hasten GDP recovery and curtail NPLs (Rogoff 
2015). 
                                               
9
 See Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, Dumas and Weber (1995) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for the classic 
findings. 
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 Given the observed link between the rise of NPLs and current and past crises, a growing 
economics literature has tried to find statistically significant indicators of non-performing loans. 
Broadly, this literature can be split between research on firm-level indicators, and research on 
wider macro-economic conditions. Key bank-specific factors tested for their correlation with 
NPLs include leverage (assets-to-equity), profitability (for example, net interest margin and 
return on assets) and efficiency (for example, cost-to-income) ratios. Since leverage is an 
indicator of banks’ solvency and risk appetite, many scholars have found that lower 
capitalisation is correlated with higher levels of non-performing loans (Salas and Saurina 2002; 
Keeton and Morris 1987). The link between profitability and non-performing loans is more 
equivocal. If profitability reflects the quality of the firm’s asset management, then this might 
indicate that the bank will generate fewer non-performing loans, as found by Klein (2013). 
Profits flow into retained earnings and this strengthens the capital position of banks. Alternately, 
higher profits (greater reward) might reflect greater riskiness and therefore higher non-
performing loans in due course. The relationship between cost efficiency and NPLs may be 
similarly double-edged. A low cost-to-income ratio may indicate a firm that is efficient, 
including in loan origination (Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas 2010; Podpiera and Weill 2008; 
Williams 2004; Berger and DeYoung 1997). Yet it could also indicate that the firm is making 
insufficient investment in its underwriting process that will lead to NPLs in the future (Rossi, 
Schwaiger and Winkler 2005).  
Besides bank-specific factors, another strand of literature tests the statistical relationship 
between macroeconomic conditions and NPLs. Many studies show a correlation between 
declines in GDP (Bech, Jabubik and Piloiu 2013) and increases in unemployment, on the one 
hand, and NPLs on the other (Fofack 2005; Dhal and Rajan 2003). The likely reason is because 
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 594 April 2016 
 
15 
both of these macro variables signal lower national income from which loans can be repaid 
(Klein 2013).
10
 This is also why current account deficits are sometimes found to have a link with 
NPLs, especially in countries that rely heavily on external trade as a source of national income. 
Other studies find that currency depreciation is correlated with NPLs. Bringing these factors 
together, Jakubik and Reininger (2013) propose a model based on their empirical studies of 
NPLs in CESEE countries but perhaps with broader application, and with echoes of Minsky: 
 
In boom times, the national economy is characterized by high, possibly 
overheating GDP growth amid a benign international environment in which 
financial investors have a positive perception of future financial and economic 
developments in the country concerned, leading to higher national stock index 
levels, nominal appreciation of the national currency…and lower nonperforming 
loans. But then credit to the private sector starts outpacing GDP growth. This 
leads to loosening underwriting standards. When the boom ends, there is a fall in 
the stock market, GDP slows down, currency depreciates, and NPLs rise (Jakubik 
and Reininger 2013). 
 
The balance sheet counterpart of a rise in NPLs on the assets side is an eventual 
diminution to bank capital on the claims side. This is particularly the case if a firm’s proportion 
of LLPs to NPLs (coverage ratio) is low (Beatty and Liao 2011; Fitch 2009). In general, it is 
desirable for banks to have a level of provisioning commensurate with the initial expectations of 
recovery on loans (and therefore the pricing of credit).
11
 If this is not so, then the scale of losses 
may be so large that they cannot be covered by income, bringing a bank’s capital below or close 
to the minima required. At that point, banks might have to recapitalise when they and the wider 
system are in crisis. However, crises are the worst possible moment for a bank to raise capital, as 
investors may be wary of subscribing new shares when profits are falling and general economic 
                                               
10
 The link between inflation and NPLs is ambiguous. As Klein notes, although high inflation reduces the real value 
of debts, it may also reduce obligors’ real income for repayment of those debts if wages are sticky. 
11
 For example, for collateralised lending, provisions under US GAAP and IFRS are net of the recoveries on 
liquidating collateral. So when the provisions are compared to the gross amount of the non-performing loan, they 
can be adequate even if less than 100% if there is adequate collateral. 
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conditions may be poor. As a general rule of thumb then, bank recapitalisation during a crisis is 
second best to higher LLPs before they occur. Conversely, delayed loan loss recognition and low 
LLPs during boom conditions exacerbate pro-cyclical lending (Beatty and Liao 2011). And 
delays in LLP recognition pre-crisis can lead banks to reduce lending during busts because 
further asset growth can increase their risk of insolvency. The resulting credit crunch can thereby 
amplify the severity of the downturn. In brief, insufficient LLPs ex ante manifest ex post as 
losses to bank equity and systemic crises.  
 However, the 2007 GFC is a good example of how LLPs can be under-provisioned when 
the path of future NPLs differs from historical experience. For example, mortgage delinquencies 
and low recovery rates on repossessed houses from the 2007 house price fall in the US far 
exceeded any previous market downturns, so there was considerable under-provisioning for these 
losses (Furlong and Knight 2010).
12
 Figure 1, based on the stylized framework of Laeven and 
Majnoni (2003), compares an ex ante loan loss distribution function
13
 (solid green curve) for a 
bank with the realized or ex post loss distribution function (dashed red curve) which has shifted 
considerably to the right under conditions of an extreme market downturn, as in the case of the 
period after 2007. The estimated expected losses for which provisioning is undertaken is given 
by OA in Figure 1. The amount of capital for unexpected losses is given as A-B. This is in 
keeping with models for economic capital based on estimates of deviations from the mean where 
capital to cover losses is calculated for a high 99 percentile confidence level of the tail of the loss 
distributions.  In Figure 1, this has been marked by points B and B#. The rightward shift of the 
realized loss distribution implies that the bank now has to contend with a substantial  
                                               
12
 In 2005, the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) stated that, “while historical loss experience 
provides a reasonable starting point, historical losses, or even recent trends in losses, are not by themselves, a 
sufficient basis to determine an adequate level. Management should also consider any factors that are likely to cause 
estimated losses to differ from historical loss experience.”    
13
 We follow the well-known convention that losses are converted into positive values and the distribution function 
for losses is given as a right tailed distribution (see, Dowd 2002).     
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Figure 1: Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) based on Expected Losses and Capital for 
Unexpected Losses: Ex Ante Pre 2007 (Solid Green Curve) and Ex Post 2007 (Dash Red 
Curve) Loan Loss Distributions.   
 
recapitalization programme equal to B-B# in Figure 1 which arises from a direct 
underestimation of capital requirements. The amount A-A# is the post 2007 average 
value of NPLs which exceeds loan loss provisions and gives an estimate for the extent to 
which bank capital has been eroded as current income has to offset NPLs. 
 
2. Strategic trade-offs from provisioning for NPLs  
Given the potential systemic consequences that can result from NPLs, higher levels of 
loan loss provisioning and their early recognition would seem desirable. However, adequate 
provisioning for NPLs requires factoring in the complex strategic choices banks face when 
making provisioning decisions. This section discusses some of these (see also Beck and 
Narayanamoorthy 2013; Beatty and Liao 2011; Hasan and Wall 2004; Laeven and Majnoni 
2003; Borio, Furfine and Lowe 2001). They include trade-offs between regulatory capital and 
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loan write-offs, on the one hand, and loan loss provisions, on the other. Other considerations 
include a bank’s business model, how they classify loans and the tax treatment of LLPs. 
Although we only treat these issues at a conceptual level in this paper, our ambition in future 
work is to model them formally; for example, by developing an agent-based stress testing 
framework of G-SIBs to analyse how banks can optimally balance the demands for dynamic, 
forward-looking loan loss provisions against increased capital requirements, and constraints on 
the size of total general provisions and countercyclical capital.  
 
Regulatory capital 
Current regulatory capital requirements give banks strategic reasons for wanting to keep 
LLPs low. The Basel Committee’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) and Tier 1 capital adequacy 
ratios include common stock and retained earnings. Since higher LLPs are taken as losses in the 
period when they are recognised, they reduce retained earnings and hence the CET1 and Tier 1 
capital ratios.
14
 This implies a trade-off between reporting higher Common Equity Tier 1 and 
Tier 1 capital ratios on the one hand and maintaining adequate LLPs on the other.  
Whilst LLPs reduce retained earnings in all cases, some provisions can qualify for an “add-back” 
to Tier 2, or a lower tier, of regulatory capital, subject to certain constraints
15
 (Ng and Roychowdhury, 
2013). The availability of such an add-back may in some cases influence banks’ decision-
making. While there has been considerable debate on whether the constraints in place on adding 
back provisions into capital will adversely affect banks from making timely and adequate 
forward provisions for losses,
16
 limited research exists to confirm or deny this hypothesis. In a 
                                               
 
15
 The amount of such an add-back, which usually only applies to ‘general’ provisions rather than those designated 
against specific assets, is usually limited to a certain percentage of risk-weighted assets. 
16
 There are the well-known positions taken at the American Bankers Association meeting on March 17, 2010, by 
the (then) Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
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related vein, there is limited evidence on whether the inclusion of a countercyclical capital buffer 
of up to 2.5% of risk weighted assets for selected banks under Basel III will lead these banks to 
lower loan loss provisions. Ng and Chowdhury (2013) have argued that an increase in capital, 
especially in the form of “add backs” from LLPs, increases pro-cyclical lending rather than 
decreases it.  
 
Write-offs  
 Another trade-off that exists is between loan loss provisions and the level of write-offs. 
This follows from the accounting identity that the provisions at the end of one period are equal to 
provisions at the start of the period, plus or minus any additional provisions or write-backs, 
minus the effect of reductions in the portfolio (such as disposals of loans, or loans reaching 
maturity), minus write-offs. A loan is written-off when the bank no longer expects the principal 
to be repaid. This results in both the loans and the provisions against them disappearing from the 
balance sheet. Since some loans tend to have higher provisions as a proportion of the gross 
amount of the loan, it follows that a bank that elects to write off more of its highly provisioned 
problem loans will show lower provisions as a percentage of their gross loans than a bank with 
the same number of highly provisioned problem loans that did not. However, the aggregate ratio 
of LLPs to gross loans or to NPLs is often used by credit rating agencies to assess the riskiness 
of banks. Other things being equal, a higher aggregate provisioning ratio makes banks appear 
less risky. So there is an incentive for banks to not write-off highly provisioned loans even if 
they should. For example, Jassaud and Kang (2015) claim that one reason why Italian banks 
                                                                                                                                                       
Chairperson Sheila Bair. John Dugan argued for the relaxation of restrictions on the inclusion of loan loss reserves 
as capital, to encourage banks to report adequate and timely reserves. In contrast, Sheila Bair contested this view, 
arguing that “letting more reserves count [towards capital] could dramatically, in our view, dilute the quality of 
capital” (Ng and Roychowdury 2013). 
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have delayed writing-off NPLs is that these would lower their overall provisioning ratio and 
possibly their external credit rating.
17
 Yet, the persistence of NPLs on bank balance sheets is a 
key reason for delay in the recovery from the GFC (Nkusu 2011; Espinoza and Prasad 2010). 
 
Business models 
 The level of LLPs on a bank’s balance sheet will reflect its level of non-performing and 
impaired loans. These in turn reflect a firm’s chosen business model. Some banks’ business 
models are more risky than others. At one end of the spectrum are conservative banks who seek 
to minimise credit risk, NPLs, and LLPs by only making loans whose principal and interest they 
expect will be fully repaid. In the not-so-distant past, prudent banking in the UK meant banks 
tried to minimise loan losses. While this behaviour had many advantages from a financial 
stability and systemic risk perspective, the disadvantage was that bank profits were lower than 
they might otherwise have been because loan origination levels were lower. As a corollary, loans 
were less available to borrowers (Billings and Capie 2001). 
 By contrast, in recent decades, UK banks have increased their risk appetite in pursuit of 
greater financial reward. As a result, there is now a greater tolerance for some level of credit risk, 
NPLs, and LLPs if it is profitable. Nowadays banks weigh up the marginal revenue from loans 
against the marginal costs from provisions, impairments, and losses, and may make loans even if 
the amounts collected from borrowers are less than the amount promised to be repaid in the loan 
contract. The result is a more risky financial system but also a more profitable and credit 
abundant one (Bholat and Gray 2013). 
 
                                               
17
 Jassaud and Kang also cite a lack of tax rebates on losses in Italy, and also that the current accounting standard in 
Europe (IAS 39) is not explicit on exactly when and how to write off uncollectible loans. 
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Accounting classification 
 Related to the issue of banks’ business models is how they classify their loans. In the past 
loans originated by banks were held to maturity and accordingly carried at book value subject to 
impairment tests. However, many banks now buy other banks’ loans, and sell and securitise their 
own. These loans may in turn be shown at fair market value on the balance sheet. Although the 
economic effect of losses on loans is the same for banks however they are categorised, the actual 
accounting label they are given impacts where and when provisions and losses are reported in 
financial statements. Where loans are at fair value, the amount of credit loss that is charged to the 
income statement equals the market expectation of loss, rather than that of the entity itself. In an 
economic downturn, the market expectation might be more severe, sometimes significantly, than 
the bank’s own expectation, resulting in greater losses. In brief, because business models vary 
across firms, including their intentions to buy, hold, or sell loans, so too will the valuation of 
loans and therefore their level of provisioning, even if two firms have exactly the same amount 
of loans on their books.
18
 
 
Tax treatment  
Finally, another issue bearing on how NPLs are provisioned for is their tax treatment. The 
tax treatment of accounting provisions varies by jurisdiction. In some places, all accounting 
provisions are allowable for offset against taxable income. In others, only certain types of 
                                               
18
 Up to now firms have classified financial instruments as either loans at amortised cost (or securities held to 
maturity), available for sale, or held for trading. Going forward, under a new international accounting standard IFRS 
9, banks will classify financial assets such as loans on two criteria. The first is the firm’s business model for 
managing the financial asset. The second is the nature of the contractual terms governing the cash flow. If, as is the 
case with most loans, a bank carries the asset on their balance sheet to collect the contacted cash flow and these 
specify repayment of principal and interest, then the asset will be measured at amortised cost and changes in fair 
value will not be recognised unless the asset is sold or reclassified, with the exception of impairments. Otherwise 
financial assets are measured at fair value, with changes in their saleable value reflected in gains or losses during the 
reporting period when they occur (Weil, Schipper and Francis 2012: 533-534).  
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provision are allowable, usually in cases where a loss is more certain (Sunley 2003). And still 
other tax authorities allow loan loss charges only when the underlying loan has been written off. 
The potential to realise a tax benefit provides an obvious incentive to prefer some means of loan 
loss recognition over others, or to recognise tax-deductible losses in certain periods. 
Consider the following example. Accounting regimes require provisions to be deducted 
from earnings in the period when they are made. However, the fiscal authority may not recognise 
them as a deductible expense at the same time, instead doing so when losses manifest. That 
means provisions may be added back to taxable income increasing the overall base on which the 
tax is applied. Banks will recognise a deferred tax asset. However, if, for example, tax rates fall 
in the future, the bank makes insufficient profit against which to claim the tax credit, or the bank 
moves its operations to a jurisdiction with a lower corporate tax rate, then the value of that 
deferred tax asset will be less than anticipated so that the actual amount of taxes the bank pays 
over time is more than if the provisions had been tax deductible in the first place (Weil, Schipper 
and Francis 2014). The extent to which tax considerations actually influence provisioning 
behaviour among firms is a topic worthy of further empirical research. The important point to 
bear in mind here is simply that there are tax implications that must be factored into thinking 
about loan loss provisioning. 
 
3. Divergences in the definition of NPLs  
 So far, we have assumed that the meaning of NPLs is obvious and required no further 
elaboration. In fact, nothing is further from the truth. As this section notes, there may be material 
divergences in how regulators, firms and commercial vendors calculate these figures. 
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Regulatory treatment 
 An important aspect of global financial regulation in the last few decades is that the 
definition of regulatory banking capital has been subject to a substantial degree of harmonisation 
because of work promoted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, starting with the 
Basel I agreement in 1988. Recently, there also has been progress towards a common 
international understanding of liabilities as a by-product of resolvability assessments, recovery 
planning, and ‘bail in’ regulation because it has been necessary to establish a hierarchy of debt 
instruments (Bates 2014; European Union Directives 2014/59/EU and No 806/2014; Financial 
Stability Board 2014; European Banking Authority 2014). But while claims on banks are 
increasingly comparable internationally, much less traction has been made on standardising the 
asset side of the balance sheet, especially with respect to loan classification and the definition of 
non-performing loans. In fact, there can be material divergences in NPL definitions across 
jurisdictions.  
Research conducted by Barisitz (2011, 2013) gives an overview of the general drivers 
behind these differences.
19
 He finds that a majority of countries in his study classify loans as 
non-performing when principal or interest is 90 days or more past due and/or there is “well-
defined weakness of loan or borrower” (Barisitz 2011). But two issues complicate matters. First, 
the definition of “well-defined weakness” remains unspecified within and across jurisdictions. In 
other words, different firms and regulators have different data, and different interpretations of 
data, used to estimate obligors’ ability to repay, and whether it has deteriorated. Second, there 
are other dimensions besides time (since last repayment) that matter in certain jurisdictions. 
These include: whether collateral, guarantees, or other forms of security are factored into the 
                                               
19
 Barisitz compares definitions in ten CESEE countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. 
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credit classification process; whether the full outstanding value or only part of a loan is reported 
as non-performing; and how to treat restructured loans. Qualitative factors sometimes matter too. 
Even if repayments are made on time, a loan can go into default if the borrower breaches a 
contractual covenant, for example, by exceeding a maximum leverage threshold specified in the 
loan contract. 
In CESEE countries, for example, there is divergence across the region in terms of 
whether jurisdictions take a ‘product’ or ‘customer’ view when determining if loans are 
performing or not. At issue is the following: suppose an obligor has two or more loans from the 
same credit institution. If the obligor falls behind repayment on one loan but is repaying on the 
other, there is debate about whether the performing loan should also be classified as non-
performing, i.e. adopting a ‘customer’ view, since the delinquency on one loan implies that the 
obligor’s overall financial state has deteriorated. 
The table in appendix 1 provides examples of loan and credit classifications based on 
public information from financial supervisory and regulatory authorities in the G20. Like 
Barisitz we find convergence around the global statistical definition of NPLs established by the 
UN System of National Accounts, and followed by all countries adhering to IMF or European 
reporting standards: “a loan is non-performing when payments of interest or principal are past 
due by 90 days or more, or interest payments equal to 90 days or more have been capitalized, 
refinanced, or delayed by agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are 
other good reasons (such as a debtor filing for bankruptcy) to doubt that payments will be made 
in full” (United Nations System of National Accounts 2008). On the other hand, no two 
definitions in our table are exactly alike. Loan quality classification schemes range from three to 
nine categories in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, like the UN statistical definition, which 
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comes with the proviso that the UN “definition of a non-performing loan is to be interpreted 
flexibly,” the drafting of these definitions leaves scope for firm discretion because the meaning 
of phrases like “objective evidence of impairment” are not always precisely defined. There are 
also likely differences within jurisdictions across time, and again between jurisdictions in terms 
of the intensity of prudential enforcement of NPL standards.  
In the past, there have been efforts by some international bodies to establish firmer 
guidelines in the context of assessing credit risk for regulatory capital purposes. For example, 
under the Basel II capital framework published by the Basel Committee in 2004, a system of 
credit risk calibration based on banks’ own internal risk models was introduced. This system was 
retained under Basel III. For those portfolios where banks elect to develop systems to follow this 
approach, the IRB methodology requires firms to provide their own estimates of probability of 
default, loss given default and exposure at default. To do so, a definition of default was 
established (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004). 
Default is defined as where an obligor is 90 days past due, or is unlikely to pay its 
credit obligations to the banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to 
actions such as realising security. Indicators of unlikeliness to pay include the 
following: 
-the bank puts the credit obligation on non-accrued status; 
-the bank makes a charge-off or account-specific provision resulting from a 
significant perceived decline in credit quality subsequent to the bank taking on the 
exposure; 
-the bank sells the credit obligation at a material credit-related economic loss; 
-the bank consents to a distressed restructuring of the credit obligation where this 
is likely to result in a diminished financial obligation caused by the material 
forgiveness, or postponement, of principal, interest or (where relevant) fees;  
-the bank has filed for the obligor’s bankruptcy or a similar order in respect of the 
obligor’s credit obligation to the banking group; or 
-the obligor has sought or has been placed in bankruptcy or similar protection 
where this would avoid or delay repayment of the credit obligation to the banking 
group.
20
  
                                               
20
 In view of the passage of time since this wording was issued, two things are noticeable with regard to these 
criteria. The first is that it is not very different from later definitions of ‘non-performing’ issued by the EBA (see 
below). The second is that the first of the indicators listed above makes reference to an accounting concept (non-
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 Two years later, the Basel Committee issued guidance that specifically mentioned loan 
classification (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006). It recommended banks have a 
credit classification system on the basis of credit risk but stopped short of spelling out the 
classification scheme.
21
 While some bodies, such as the Institute of International Finance have 
established such systems (Table 2), these lack the force of international law. And the Institute of 
International Finance’s system, while admirable, does not establish thresholds when loans should 
fall into the various categories but rather simply proposes a set of universal categories.  
 
Table 2: Institute of International Finance loan classification scheme 
Loan Category Definition 
Standard Credit is sound and all principal and interest payments are current. Repayment 
difficulties are not foreseen under current circumstances and full repayment is 
expected. 
Watch Asset subject to conditions that, if left uncorrected, could raise concerns about full 
repayment. These require more than normal attention by credit officers. 
Substandard Full repayment is in doubt due to inadequate protection (e.g., obligor net worth or 
collateral) and/or interest or principal or both are more than 90 days overdue. 
These assets show underlying, well defined weaknesses that could lead to 
probable loss if not corrected and risk becoming impaired assets. 
Doubtful Assets for which collection/liquidation in full is determined by bank management 
to be improbable due to current conditions and/or interest or principal or both are 
overdue more than 180 days. Assets in this category are considered impaired, but 
are not yet considered total losses because some pending factors may strengthen 
the asset’s quality (merger, new financing, or capital injection). 
Loss An asset is downgraded to loss when management considers the facility to be 
virtually uncollectible and/or principal or interest or both are overdue more than 
one year. 
 
Source: Krueger (2002). The scheme is due to be revised by the Institute of International Finance in 2015. 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
accrual loans) that does not exist under the newer international accounting standards (IFRS) used in most 
jurisdictions but does exist under US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP).  
21
 In a further consultative document issued in December 2014 on revisions to the standardised approach for credit 
risk, the BCBS for the first time suggests a definition of non-performing, whose threshold includes (amongst other 
criteria) 90 days past due for loans, and 30 days past due for securities. The purpose of these criteria is to calculate a 
‘non-performing asset’ (NPA) ratio when assessing exposures to other banks. At the time of issue, the proposals in 
this consultation were described by the Basel Committee as “at an early stage of development”. 
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Firm accounting 
The absence of common, cross-border accounting standards for judging when loans are 
impaired makes like-for-like comparisons between banks difficult for users of their financial 
statements (Laurin and Majnoni 2003). The table in appendix 2 presents extracts from the annual 
reports of financial institutions identified as G-SIBs.
22
 As we saw in our review of NPLs as 
defined by prudential regulators, while there is convergence towards the definition of an NPL as 
being loans 90 days or more past due, there are also differences along quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions. Quantitatively, the threshold for NPLs range from 60 to 270 days, depending in part 
on the financial product. Several banks, for example, defer classifying first lien, residential 
mortgages as NPLs for some time after 90 days since last repayment. The same is sometimes the 
case where the loans are to government or government-backed entities. Credit cards are also 
sometimes treated differently. Qualitatively, the detail of the definitions, and their substance, also 
show variety. For example, some firms take into account the status of the counterparty, 
particularly whether they have been declared bankrupt in the past or at present. Also, some firms 
explicitly address loan restructuring and concessions to borrowers, while in other instances the 
issue of loan restructuring, and, by extension, forbearance is not addressed.    
Indeed in the wake of the GFC, one area where the lack of an internationally harmonised 
accounting concept of NPLs and impairment was suspected of giving an especially incomplete 
picture of the health of the financial system was with respect to forbearance, that is, the 
restructuring of troubled loans.
23
 While IAS 39 is clear that restructuring is a credit event that 
                                               
22
 Compiled by the authors using the list of G-SIBs published by the Financial Stability Board on 6 November 2014, 
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141106b.pdf. 
23
 In 2011 the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a guidance document on loan forbearance, noting that 
“we have concerns that certain accounting practices can have the effect of concealing the full effect of impairment 
and forbearance and thus may not present the true nature of credit risk within retail portfolios” (Financial Services 
Authority 2011). Similar concerns were raised the same year in the US when the accounting standard-setter clarified 
its guidance around the definition of troubled debt restructurings (incidentally a term used only in US accounting), 
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might lead to impairment, and impairments have to be calculated based on the difference 
between the original and modified conditions, the standard does not rule out cases of 
restructuring where there is no impairment and there is ambiguity about whether once 
restructured, an exposure needs to continue being identified as impaired. Consequently, lenders 
can choose to extend or otherwise modify the terms of loans that show evidence of financial 
stress, these loans might avoid arrears and as such might not be identified as impaired (or non-
performing), despite underlying credit deterioration of the borrower. If terms were modified, 
there is no means of distinguishing problem loans from the general pool of performing loans if 
neither arrears nor impairment provisions were booked under IAS 39. The existence of large-
scale avoidance of arrears through forbearance (sometimes known as “extend and pretend”) 
therefore might be invisible to regulators, investors, and other users of financial statements. 
Indeed, in the past, forbearance sometimes has been a key cause of financial crises, as during the 
so-called ‘Tequila crisis’ in Mexico (Calomiris and Haber 2014).24 
 
Commercial data sources  
To add oil to an already inflamed problem, other publicly available and widely used data 
sources on bank asset quality can give slightly different representations of balance sheet health. 
                                                                                                                                                       
with the aim of developing more consistent standards in determining whether a modification of a loan receivable 
constitutes a concession to a borrower that is experiencing financial difficulty. 
24
 While forbearance may be inappropriate if the obligor has no real chance of recovery, as this can hamper the 
reallocation of resources to other sectors of the economy and weigh down long-term productivity, it may be 
appropriate if an obligor is suffering just from a temporary cash flow problem, or restructuring or strategically 
reclassifying the loan gives them time to recover and become economically viable (Arrowsmith, Griffiths, Franklin, 
Wohlmann, Young and Gregory 2013). Indeed in the past regulators have sanctioned loan forbearance at a firm or 
system-wide level during financial crises as a means to stave off their worst depths (cf. Kane 2015). Consider the 
Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. In August 1982 “the total risk to the nine money-centre banks in New York 
was estimated at more than three times the capital of those banks. The regulators, analysts say, did not force the 
banks to value those loans at the fire-sale prices of the moment, helping to avert a disaster in the banking system. In 
other words, the nine biggest banks were all insolvent in the 1980s” (Lohr 2009). The accounting treatment of non-
performing loans encouraged regulators to effectively delay the recognition of any losses until banks had had the 
time to build up loan loss reserves (Haben 2015).  
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Here we compare data for some key NPL-related ratios from Bankscope and The Banker 
magazine.
 
The Bankscope database contains financial statement information on more than 
29,000 private and public banks globally over more than 15 years. The Banker magazine tracks 
the top 1,000 bank holding companies on a global basis based on their Tier 1 Capital as defined 
by the Basel Committee. Here we look at figures for G-SIBs
25
 in North America, Europe, and 
Japan from 2005 to 2014. This sample period gives a good idea about data quality in the pre and 
post crisis periods.   
The Banker reports the ratio for NPLs to Gross Total Loans, where NPLs are defined as 
all loans that are overdue for longer than 90 days. These figures come from a survey sent by The 
Banker to these firms and cross-checked against publicly disclosed data.  In contrast, Bankscope 
does not report NPLs. Instead it reports impaired loans. The source of these figures is mostly 
banks’ annual reports and accounts, and these are all loans that have a specific impairment 
against them. However, as Bankscope notes, “there is no conformity to defining impaired loans, 
both across country and intracountry” because all accounting standards “are vague in their 
definition of when a loan is impaired” and because “management discretion can change from one 
year to the next within a particular bank.”26 
Figure 1 plots the respective ratios for NPLs and Total Impaired Loans to gross loans from 
The Banker and Bankscope, respectively. Both sources give similar sized ratios and 
directionality, increasing from 1% and 1.5% respectively to 4% and 4.5% in 2009, respectively.  
                                               
25
 This includes 28 G-SIBS that are common to both data sets for all of the variables for the sample period:  
HSBC Holdings, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Deutsche Bank, Credit Agricole, BNP Paribas, JP Morgan Chase 
& Co, Bank of America, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Mizuho Financial Group, Citigroup, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, SocieteGenerale, Groupe BPCE, Lloyds Banking Group, Wells Fargo & Co, UBS, UniCredit, ING 
Bank, Credit Suisse Group, Goldman Sachs, Nordea Group, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Commerzbank, 
Morgan Stanley, Standard Chartered, Dexia, Bank of New York Mellon.   
26
 From Bankscope user guide > Fitch impaired loans. It is well known among users of Bscope data (see Glen and 
Mondragon-Vélez 2011) that the Bankscope data reported under the rubric of Total Impaired Loans and Assets has 
to be dealt with some care as a representation of non-performing loans.   
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 594 April 2016 
 
30 
Figure 1 NPL or impaired loans/Gross Loans Ratio from the two data sources: Bankscope ( in brown) and 
Banker Magazine (in blue) 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Bankscope and The Banker magazine. 
Ratio given by the sum of the respective values in the numerator and the denominator for 28 G-SIBs. 
 
After that, the Bankscope ratio remains about 0.5% higher than the one for The Banker. The 
ratios from both sources coincide at about 4.3% in 2013 and then dip down together in 2014. 
Figure 2 compares The Banker’s figure for Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans against 
the ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans from Bankscope.
27
 While both show a distinct 
hump in 2009, indicating increased provisioning for loan losses with the onset of the financial 
                                               
27
 From the BScope user guide on asset quality the loan loss reserve/gross loans ratio is defined as follows. “This 
ratio indicated how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. It is a reserve for losses 
expressed as percentage of total loans. Given a similar charge-off policy the higher the ratio the poorer the quality of 
the loan portfolio will be.” 
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crisis, the Bankscope data is consistently higher for this ratio by at least 1% for the pre-crisis 
period and by 2% in the post-crisis period.  
Figure 2 Loan Loss Reserves/Gross Loan Ratio (Bankscope, in brown), and Loan Loss Provisions/Gross 
Loans ratio (Banker magazine, in blue) 
 
 
 
  
Sources: Bankscope and The Banker magazine data.  
 
Figures 3a and 3b plot ‘over/under-provisioning’ ratios for G-SIBs based in select 
advanced economies.  For Bankscope data this is estimated as the ratio of reserves to total 
impaired loans. For The Banker this is estimated as the ratio of provisions to non-performing 
loans. When these ratio fall, it may provide a signal of under-provisioning. Thus this ratio is a 
rough indicator of firms’ credit risk management.28 
                                               
28
 There are other ratios such as called the “Texas ratio” given by the ratio of unprovisioned NPLs to capital and 
reserves (Jassaud and Kang 2015). The Texas ratio has been used as a measure of a bank’s likelihood of failure as it 
indicates whether it has enough buffers to deal with its bad assets.  A ratio above 100 percent indicates that banks 
have insufficient buffers to cover unexpected losses. 
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Figure 3A BScope data for G-SIBs in select countries: Reserves to Total Impaired Loans  
 
 
 
Figure 3B BMag Select Countries’ G-SIBs: Ratio of Loan Loss Provisioning to Non-Performing Loans   
 
 
Sources:Bankscope (Bscope) and The Banker magazine (BMag) data. Data on banks in US, UK, Japan, 
Netherlands, France and Germany. 
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There are clearly definitional differences that are the source of the discrepancies shown 
above. The point made here is not that one source is more accurate than the other, but rather that 
the absence of a common benchmark can cause users of these information sources to come to 
different conclusions. Both charts show that US G-SIBs were more highly provisioned than those 
G-SIBs in other countries before the 2007 financial crisis. However, apart from 2005 and 2006, 
Bankscope data gives lower figures for impairments than The Banker does for NPLs. As a result, 
Bankscope data shows a very high provisioning ratio of about 380% for US G-SIBs in 2007, 
while The Banker counterpart is a more modest 150%. More generally, the Bankscope data 
shows US G-SIBs provisioned at above 100% up to 2010, while The Banker data shows 
provisioning at under 100% by 2008. Similarly, Bankscope data suggests that Germany, France 
and UK G-SIBs were close to a 100% provisioning ratio in the period leading up to the GFC, 
while The Banker data shows these banks as being much less well-provisioned. In making policy 
judgements, such as assessing whether banks were ‘adequately’ provisioned at the onset of the 
crisis in different jurisdictions, these differences might result in unintended conclusions if the 
definitions used in sourcing the data are not well understood. 
 
4. Loan loss accounting  
 One area where one might expect the meaning of non-performing loans to be reasonably 
well defined is in accounting. However, neither International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) nor US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) treats the topic of non-
performing loans as such. Rather, the focus is on impaired loans and note disclosures on credit 
risk. However, the accounting frameworks governing the impairment of loans are not globally 
harmonised, and recent developments in accounting standard-setting might result in further 
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divergence, particularly between the US and IFRS jurisdictions.
29
 We discuss these and related 
issues in this section. 
 
The incurred loss model 
On the eve of the financial crisis, both the IFRS and the US GAAP accounting standards 
that governed impairment of financial assets operated under a model known as ‘incurred loss.’ 
This meant that impairment was only recognised when a loss event had occurred. Within IFRS, 
the standard IAS 39 is specific that “losses expected as a result of future events, no matter how 
likely, are not recognised.” Although not reflected in the wording of the standard, this was 
sometimes interpreted as meaning that actual arrears had to take place before provisioning was 
allowed. Either a loan was determined to be impaired (either individually or in a portfolio 
assessment), hence requiring a provision; or, there was no impairment charge for the loan(s) in 
question. In the US, whilst the notion of ‘incurred loss’ also formed the basis of accounting 
standards, the exact wording of the accounting literature differed to that used under IFRS, and 
provisions of US banks were sometimes higher than those for banks reporting under IFRS. As 
well as taking charges for impairment provisions, US banks place certain loans in ‘nonaccrual’ 
status, and no interest income is recognised for loans designated in this way. This latter practice 
is not shared by banks in IFRS jurisdictions.
30
 
                                               
29
 As at April 2015, 114 jurisdictions require the use of IFRS by all or most public companies (IASB 2015), 
including the European Union. However, there are notable exceptions: IFRS is not used by US companies and is not 
mandatory in Japan.  
30
 It is also not an explicit accounting requirement under US GAAP, but there is guidance included in regulatory 
reporting instructions for US banks and the use of non-accrual loans is predominant practice in the US (IASB Staff 
Paper 2011). It is used for: (a) assets maintained on a cash basis because of deterioration in the financial condition of 
the borrower; (b) assets for which payment in full of principal or interest is not expected; and (c) assets for which 
principal or interest has been in default for a period of 90 days or more unless the asset is both well secured and in 
the process of collection. 
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 594 April 2016 
 
35 
 Additional information on asset quality could be discerned through further analysis of the 
accounts prepared by banks. For example, under IFRS, firms were required to disclose credit 
quality information on those financial assets that were not past due; analysis of assets that were 
past due but not impaired, showing how far in arrears they were; and a further analysis of those 
that were determined to be impaired. Whilst this meant that the extent to which provisions 
covered loans that were past due was disclosed consistently, the nature of disclosure of non-
impaired loans was left up to the reporting firm, as long as certain higher-level disclosure 
principles were met. For these latter assets, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) preferred an approach that gave more discretion to firms in determining credit quality, 
stating as its basis for this conclusion that “because this information will vary between entities, 
the Board decided not to specify a particular method for giving this information, but rather to 
allow each entity to devise a method that is appropriate to its circumstances.” As a result, banks’ 
disclosure practice has varied in this area. While some banks show asset quality tables based on 
internally determined probabilities of default, others take a more qualitative approach in 
describing credit quality classifications. 
One of the reasons that banks under IFRS had relatively few accounting or disclosure 
guidelines to follow when it comes to loan quality assessment is that IFRS standards are not 
intended to be industry-specific. This has the advantage that accounting principles can remain 
consistent across industries. However, it also means that banks, whose principal business is that 
of creating and managing credit risk may require more specific guidance than is available from 
universal accounting standards. In particular, the term ‘non-performing loan’ is specific to 
banking.  
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Expected loss model   
The period that immediately followed the GFC saw intense criticism of the ‘incurred 
loss’ model, and multiple initiatives in the area of loan loss provisioning and related disclosures, 
both from accounting standard-setters and from prudential regulators. Starting in 2009, the G20 
called for accounting standard setters to “strengthen accounting recognition of loan-loss 
provisions by incorporating a broader range of credit information” (G20 Research Group 2009). 
In the same year, the newly-created FSB
31
 encouraged accounting standard-setters to agree 
standards that “will incorporate a broader range of available credit information than existing 
provisioning requirements, so as to recognise credit losses in loan portfolios at an earlier stage” 
(FSB 2009). The FSB was thus explicit in preferring an ‘expected loss’ model of provisioning, 
rather than a retrospective incurred loss model.  
In a 2009 exposure draft, the IASB presented a set of proposals intended as the basis for a 
new provisioning model. As part of this proposal, it defined for the first time the notion of ‘non-
performing’ as “the status of a financial asset that is more than 90 days past due or is considered 
uncollectible.” Whilst the 90 day threshold often had been used informally as a definition of 
‘non-performing’, and in the Basel definition of default, this was the first reference to this 
threshold in the international accounting literature.   
However, there has been disagreement between IASB and FASB over the exact nature of 
any new provisioning model. The IASB revised its proposals from the 2009 version and issued a 
final standard on provisioning, IFRS 9, in 2014. At the time of writing, the FASB estimates that 
it will issue its standard in 2016. Both the IASB and FASB models require provisions to be based 
on forward-looking expectations and so mark a clean conceptual break from the methodology of 
incurred loss. The IASB has also jettisoned the classifications based on past due status that 
                                               
31
 The FSB took over from the 1999-born Financial Stability Forum, with a broader membership.  
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previously formed part of the disclosure framework around it. Unlike the 2009 draft, the term 
‘non-performing’ does not appear in the accounting standard. One reason for this may be that a 
definition of a set number of days past due is arguably of less relevance in a standard where 
provisions are calculated on a forward-looking basis.
32
 
Under the IASB approach, the forward-looking provision is governed by a three-stage 
model. Loans where no significant increase in credit risk has (yet) occurred are deemed to be at 
‘stage 1’, and a provision set at losses expected from events in the next 12 months is raised.33 
However, where a ‘significant increase in credit risk’ is deemed to have occurred, the amount 
provided increases such that losses expected from events over the lifetime of a loan are provided 
against, thus raising, perhaps significantly, the amount of provision required. When the loss is 
then incurred, the loan moves to ‘stage 3’ and interest income is also recorded on a basis net of 
credit losses. Thus whereas the current loan loss provisioning model is inherently backward-
looking, and requires banks to assess what events of loss have occurred to date, the new 
approach bases the amount of provision explicitly on expectations of future loss. 
At the time of writing, the FASB intends to issue a standard that requires provisioning 
based on expected credit loss over the lifetime of a loan for all loans. The calculation of future 
expected loss (whether under the IASB or FASB approach) necessarily involves a high degree of 
judgement based on forward-looking information. Discretion over bank loan loss provisioning 
                                               
32
 Although a rebuttable presumption exists in IFRS 9 that a significant increase in credit risk has occurred when a 
loan is already 30 days past due, the conceptual basis of the standard is based on expectations of future loss, and so 
is forward-looking. 
33
 Other approaches had been considered and rejected by the IASB. One such approach was ‘dynamic’ or statistical 
provisioning, aimed to provide an even distribution of losses through the economic cycle by requiring firms to raise 
more provisions in benign economic environments and release them in less favourable conditions. The IASB 
concluded that, since the economic cycle rather than the specific attributes of the asset in question would govern 
provisions, such an approach “would result in an allowance for credit losses that does not reflect the economic 
characteristics of the financial assets at the measurement date” and therefore was not appropriate for accounting 
purposes (IFRS Foundation 2009). The approach also necessarily involves an estimation of the economic cycle, and 
where the severity of a crisis is greater than predicted (such as in the years following 2008), can still result in large 
one-off losses. 
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can have beneficial or negative consequences depending specifically on how managers exploit 
their discretion to shape loan loss provisions (Basel Commission on Banking Supervision 2006). 
While management discretion to use loan loss provisions as a means to smooth profits is 
objectionable, better provisioning in anticipation of future deterioration is not (Bushman and 
Williams 2012). 
A further consequence of a provisioning model based on ‘expected’ rather than ‘incurred’ 
loss criteria is that the relationship between NPLs and provisions necessarily changes. As noted 
above, both NPL criteria and provisioning are currently intended to capture loans that already 
display some evidence of deterioration, and are often past due by more than a set number of 
days. In an expected loss world, however, every loan carries some level of provision against it, 
whether or not deterioration in credit quality or a loss event has occurred. In an expected loss 
world, since provisions are raised earlier, and against all loans, whether or not they are deemed 
‘non-performing’, the amount of provision increases. At the same time, it continues to be the 
case that, due to expected recoveries and proceeds from collateral liquidation, provisions need 
not cover 100% of the carrying value of NPLs. The difference between the expected and incurred 
loss approaches with respect to provisions for non-performing and other types of loans can be 
conceived graphically, as in figures 1 and 2.34 
                                               
34
 As noted above, the incurred loss model may have in practice given rise to higher provisions in some jurisdictions 
due to differences in how the accounting rules are applied. The US affords an example of a jurisdiction where 
incurred loss methodology has sometimes resulted in higher provisions in practice. However, this stylised diagram 
represents the relationship in theory between incurred loss provisions and NPLs, and is usually the case in practice 
where provisions are calibrated in this way. 
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Figure 1 Provisions in an incurred loss approach  
 
Figure 2 Provisions in an expected loss world  
 
Given the advent of expected loss provisioning, it may be the case that the very concept 
of ‘non-performing loan’ needs re-definition or re-calibration in some form, in order to provide 
more useful context in assessing the health of the balance sheet. There is also the question of 
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how the 3-stage provisioning model of the IASB might pre-suppose a system of loan 
classification in order to assess more systematically when a ‘significant increase in credit risk’ 
has occurred. In the guidance material that accompanies the new accounting standards, reference 
is made to an internal credit downgrade as an indicator of significant credit deterioration, thus 
assuming that an internal credit classification exists, at least in some cases. Although firms are 
required to disclose how they determine whether a significant increase in credit risk has 
occurred, the criteria used in internal classifications more generally are often not disclosed. As a 
result, users of financial statements may not be able to understand the full context in which a 
loan is classified or reclassified, or to what extent loans have not been determined to have 
undergone a significant increase in credit risk even where some deterioration has occurred. A 
more comprehensive classification of asset quality, showing how credit quality changes from one 
period to the next, would arguably provide further colour in understanding how the bank goes 
about applying the three-stage classification in practice. 
 
Regulatory responses in Europe 
Meanwhile, at an EU level, the European Banking Authority in 2014 published technical 
standards for the reporting of non-performing loans and forbearance.
35
 The EBA document 
provides the definition of “exposure”, “non-performing exposures” and “forborne exposures.”36 
The EBA standard centres the definition of non-performing on the notion of either 90 days past 
                                               
35
 In a similar vein, the Central Bank of Ireland in 2013 produced comprehensive guidance on accounting practice 
for loans and related disclosure. This document included standardised definitions of terms such as ‘performing loan’, 
‘non-performing loan’, ‘cured loan’, ‘foreclosed loan’ and ‘forbearance’ (Bank of Ireland 2013). 
 
36
 The focus of the EBA document is on non performing exposures (NPEs) broader than NPLs. Paragraph 149 of the 
EBA document states that for the purpose of template 18, “exposures” include all debt instruments (loans, advances 
and debt securities) and off-balance sheet exposures (loan commitments, financial guarantees and other revocable 
and irrevocable commitments) excluding trading exposures and off balance sheet exposures except held for trading 
exposures. 
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due, or where the debtor is assessed as unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full without 
realisation of collateral. Further disaggregated reporting is required for forborne assets, and those 
defined as performing but nonetheless past due by 30 or 60 days. 
In the south of the European Continent, the European Bank Coordination ‘Vienna 
Initiative’— a private-public sector platform which brings together key international financial 
institutions, international organisations, public authorities and private banks— has called for an 
action plan to address NPLs in CESEE countries. The main purpose is to establish a central 
forum for dialogue to create the right conditions for Western banks to remain engaged in 
emerging Europe. This means enhancing enforcement measures, improving consistency in the 
definition of NPLs and removing legal obstacles and execution issues in distressed transactions. 
In particular the ‘Vienna Initiative’ is trying to establish an effective coordination mechanism for 
dealing with distressed assets. NPLs are considered a serious impediment to recovery from the 
financial crisis in certain CESEE countries because they impair banks’ ability to resume lending 
and weigh down overextended borrowers (Roaf 2014).  
In sum, and looking across all of these post-crisis developments in the regulatory and 
accounting treatment of NPLs, a wide variety of approaches continue to be employed (Columba, 
Chan-Lau and Wezel 2012). Within accounting standards, differences between US and IFRS 
approaches, as well as discretion allowed to banks in determining many credit quality metrics, 
means that banks still can diverge significantly from each other in their approach to asset quality 
classification. Within the regulatory sphere, forward-looking judgment can give rise to quite 
different estimates. Arguably more than ever, users of financial information are in need of 
meaningful and comparable information indicators against which to assess the asset quality of 
banks.  
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5. Conclusion  
 The current Eurozone crisis is a stark reminder of the dangers posed to economic and 
financial stability by over-indebtedness, under-provisioning and NPLs. But as we have 
documented, the NPL situation facing Europe today is not unprecedented. Indeed it bears more 
than a passing resemblance to past crises in, inter alia, Latin America in the 1980s and Japan in 
the 1990s where protracted debt crises resulted in ‘lost decades’ (Hoshi and Kashyap 2008; 
Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap 2006; and Peek and Rosengren 2005).
 
 
Ultimately it is poor lending, rather than accounting or reporting, that causes financial 
crises. However, the timely recognition of problem loans and credit loss by banks, and proper 
transparency such that asset positions are well-understood by the market, regulators and others, 
is critical in assessing how to avert or mitigate crises. As we have seen, banks can be 
incentivised by accounting, regulatory and tax considerations in various ways when considering 
how to identify, and provide against, problem loans. This in turn can result in under-
provisioning, particularly when the economic environment is relatively benign. But the early 
recognition of expected losses in good times is generally agreed by policymakers to contribute to 
greater bank resilience and mitigate the impact of crises on banks’ balance sheets. This in turn 
lowers the probability of downturns resulting in debt crises that last several years or even 
decades. 
But even before considerations of provisioning, problem loans need to be identified 
according to criteria that are transparent, understandable and economically meaningful, and there 
is currently no universal consensus as to what these criteria should be. The introduction of 
expected loss provisioning methodologies that require loans to be classified into different 
categories adds further to the need for more understandable methods of asset quality 
classification, in order to provide adequate context for these provisions to be understood. 
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Understanding the nature and quality of bank assets remains the key to assessing the health of the 
banking system as a whole, and transparency in this area is therefore key to financial stability. 
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Appendix 1 
Loan and credit classifications across G20 countries 
 
Country 
 
NPLs/Impaired loans definition 
 
Source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina 
Commercial loans are classified as follows: (1) Normal; (2) Special 
follow-up; (3) Substandard; (4) High Insolvency Risk; (5) Unrecoverable; 
and (6) Unrecoverable based on technical criteria. Special follow-up loans 
are divided into: a) under observation, include those debtors up to 90 days 
past due in situations that if not controlled or corrected in a timely 
manner, could compromise their repayment capacity; and b) those under 
negotiation or with refinancing agreements, which include debtors that 
although unable to pay their obligations under the agreed conditions, have 
declared their intention of refinancing their debts no later than 60 days 
after becoming past due. Loan provisioning must be performed on the 
basis of the classification assigned to the debtor. 
 
Banco Central de 
la República 
Argentina
37
 
 
 
 
 
Australia 
A facility must be classified as impaired regardless of whether it is 90 
days or more past due, when there is doubt as to whether the full amounts 
due, including interest and other payments due will be achieved in a 
timely manner. This is the case even if the full extent of the loss cannot be 
clearly determined. Such a requirement applies particularly to the range of 
flexible financing facilities common in the Australian financial system, 
including loans where repayment of principal and interest occurs only as a 
single payment at maturity; and also to large money market transactions 
where doubt about collectability arises immediately in the event that 
settlement does not eventuate. 
 
Australian 
Prudential 
Regulation 
Authority
38
 
 
 
                                               
37
 Banco Central de la República Argentina December 2014, Prudential Regulations. Available from: 
<http://www.bcra.gov.ar/Pdfs/Marco_legal_normativo/marco%20normativo_i.pdf>. [9 November 2015]. 
38
 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority January 2015, Prudential Standard APS 220 Credit Quality. Available 
from: <http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/141120-APS-220.pdf>. [14 November 2015]. 
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Brazil 
The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) does not provide a formal definition of 
non-performing loans. There is a tasking force working on that, including 
through participation on an international study group coordinated by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). So far the group is about to 
propose a definition which would include (1) Delinquent Loans – more 
than 90 days overdue; (2) Other loans not overdue more than 90 days but 
classified by the lending bank as E, F, G or H, according to the regulatory 
risk classification; and (3) Renegotiated loans. Risk classification requires 
lending banks to classify loans according to a 9-level classification scale 
(AA, A, B, C, D, E, F, G or H). Such regulation follows BCB’s 
Resolution 2.682. Basically, Resolution 2.682 defines the 9-level 
classification scale and determines that financial institutions credit ratings 
must take into account a number of factors, including borrower’s financial 
economic situation and credit history. And loans overdue must be 
classified on risk levels, as following: a) from 15 to 30 days: at least risk 
level B; b) from 31 to 60 days: at least risk level C; c) from 61 to 90 days: 
at least risk level D; d) from 91 to 120 days: at least risk level E; e) from 
121 to 150 days: at least risk level F; f) from 151 to 180 days: at least risk 
level G; g) more than 180 days: risk level H. 
 
Banco Central do 
Brasil
39
 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
 The IAS 39 definition of impairment is quoted by the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). A financial asset or a 
group of financial assets is deemed to be impaired if, and only if, there is 
objective evidence of impairment as a result of one or more events that has 
occurred after the initial recognition of the asset (an incurred ‘loss event’) 
and that loss event has an impact on the estimated future cash flows of the 
financial asset or the group of financial assets that can be reliably 
estimated.  
 
Given the loss events described in IFRS (IAS 39.59a-f), and in particular 
the impact of significant financial difficulty of the issuer or obligor, a 
breach of contract, such as a default or delinquency in interest or principal 
payments, and adverse changes in the payment status of borrower, OSFI 
considers the below listed conditions to be indicative of non performing 
status. OSFI further recognizes that the below listed conditions should not 
limit the earlier recognition of impairment losses incurred in accordance 
with IAS 39: 
 
(1) a payment on a deposit with a regulated financial institution or a 
restructured loan is contractually 90 days in arrears; (2) a payment on any 
other loan (excluding credit card loans) is contractually 90 days in arrears 
unless the loan is fully secured, the collection of the debt is in process and 
the collection efforts are reasonably expected to result in repayment of the 
debt or in restoring it to a current status within 180 days from the date a 
payment has become contractually in arrears; and (3) a payment on any 
loan is contractually 180 days in arrears. Any credit card loan that has a 
payment 180 days in arrears should be written off. 
Office of the 
Superintendent of 
Financial 
Institutions
40
 
 
 
                                               
39
 Banco Central do Brasil 2015, pers. comm., 17 August. 
40
 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions December 2014, Financial Statements. Available from:  
<http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/docs/2014q3fs.pdf>. [21 September 2015]. 
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China 
According to the supervision rules, commercial banks classify their loans 
into five categories -- pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful and 
loss. Special mention loan means the borrower has ability to repay the 
loan currently but may be affected by some unfavorable factors. The last 
three categories are referred to as NPLs. 
China Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission
41
 
 
 
 
 
France  
Under the national accounting framework the concept of ‘non-
performing’ is not used. Instead it is referred to the concept of ‘doubtful’, 
whose definition is similar but non identical to the ‘non-performing’ one 
as provided by the European Banking Authority (EBA). Loans are 
considered as doubtful when the debtor is considered as “unlikely to pay” 
or when 90-day past due amounts exist (for some types of exposure, the 
period could be longer, which explains why the definition of doubtful is 
similar but not identical to the EBA one).  
Autorité de 
contrôle prudentiel 
et de résolution
42
 
 
 
 
Germany  
There is no formal definition of NPLs under German legislation. BaFin 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank therefore used impaired loans reported in 
accordance with the German Audit Report Regulation 
(Prüfungsberichtsverordnung) as an approximation for the purpose of 
determining the volume of NPLs. In particular, Section 25(2) of the 
German Audit Report Regulation regulates ‘noteworthy loans’ as loans in 
respect of which there is good reason to assume that they involve a risk of 
major parts of the institution’s total lending business becoming non-
performing. 
Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleis-
tungsaufsicht 
(BaFin)
43
 
 
 
 
India  
A non performing asset (NPA) is a loan or an advance where: (i) interest 
and/or instalment of principal remain overdue for a period of more than 
90 days in respect of a term loan; (ii) the account remains ‘out of order’ 
(…) in respect of an overdraft/cash credit (OD/CC); (iii) the bill remains 
overdue for a period of more than 90 days in the case of bills purchased 
and discounted; (iv) the instalment of principal or interest thereon remains 
overdue for two crop seasons for short duration crops; (v) the instalment 
of principal or interest thereon remains overdue for one crop season for 
long duration crops; (vi) the amount of liquidity facility remains 
outstanding for more than 90 days, in respect of a securitization 
transaction undertaken in terms of guidelines on securitization dated 
February 1, 2006; (vii) in respect of derivative transactions, the overdue 
receivables representing positive mark-to-market value of a derivative 
contract, if these remain unpaid for a period of 90 days from the specified 
due date for payment. In case of interest payments, banks should classify 
an account as NPA only if the interest due and charged during any quarter 
is not serviced fully within 90 days from the end of the quarter. 
 
Reserve Bank of 
India
44
 
 
 
 
                                               
41
 China Banking Regulatory Commission 2014, Supervision Statistics of Q2. Available from: 
<http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=403BCC3E340949998F9A87A3CAA8E023>. [8 August 2015]. 
42
 Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution 2015, pers. comm., 14 August. 
43
 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleis-tungsaufsicht 2014, Annual Report. Available from: 
<http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/dl_annualreport_2014.pdf?blob=publicationFile>. 
[11 August 2015].  
44
 Reserve Bank of India 2015, pers. comm., 24 August. 
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Indonesia  
NPLs are loans classified as substandard, doubtful and loss. Debtor has 
defaulted when: (a) there are arrears in principal and/or interest payments 
and/or other claims for 90 days although the Earning Assets (Bank fund 
provisions for gaining revenue, which are in the forms of credits, 
securities, interbank placements, acceptance claims, claims on securities 
purchased under resale agreements, derivative claims, equity 
participations, off balance sheet items and any other equivalent forms of 
fund provisions) have not fallen due in the above mentioned categories; 
(b) payments on principal and/or interests and/or other claims have not 
been received at the time the Earning Assets fall due; and (c) other 
requirements aside from payments of principal and/or interest have not 
been met, which can cause event of default. 
Bank Indonesia
45
 
 
 
 
Italy  
The Italian classification of NPL includes four sub-categories: (1) Bad 
loans: exposures to an insolvent counterparty (even if insolvency is not 
legally ascertained) or in equivalent situations, regardless of any loss 
estimate made by the bank and irrespective of any possible collateral or 
guarantee; (2) Substandard loans: exposures to counterparty facing 
temporary difficulties – defined on the basis of objective factors - that is 
expected to be overcome within a reasonable period of time; (3) 
Restructured loans: exposures in which a pool of banks or an individual 
bank, as a result of the deterioration of the borrower’s financial situation, 
agree to change the original conditions (rescheduling deadlines; reduction 
of interest rate), giving rise to a loss; and (4) Past due: exposures other 
than those classified as bad loans, substandard or restructured exposure 
that are past due for more than 90 days on a continuous basis. 
 
Bank of Italy
46
  
 
 
 
 
Japan  
Loans are classified into four categories: (i) bankrupt or de facto bankrupt 
(“bankrupt or quasi-bankrupt”), (ii) doubtful, (iii) special attention 
(“needs attention” or “substandard”) and (iv) normal. Bankrupt or de facto 
bankrupt loans are those extended “to debtors who are legally and 
formally bankrupt, i.e., in the process of liquidation, reorganization and 
rehabilitation, or virtually bankrupt with no prospects of resuscitation”. 
Doubtful loans are those extended “to debtors who have not gone 
bankrupt but are in financial difficulties, and thus whose lenders are 
unlikely to receive the principal and interest concerned on due dates”. 
Special attention loans are those “whose interest and/or principal 
payments are in arrears by 3 months or more, and restructured assets with 
changes in terms and conditions,” and the normal loans are “all loans to 
debtors who have no particular problems with their financial conditions” 
which are not classified as any of the first three categories. The total 
amount of NPLs is the sum of loans that are categorized as “bankrupt or 
de facto bankrupt,” “doubtful” and “special attention.” “Bankrupt or de 
facto bankrupt” is the most risky category of assets.  
 
 
Financial 
Services 
Agency
47
 
  
  
                                               
45
 Bank Indonesia 2015, pers. comm., 11 August. 
46
 Bank of Italy July 2013, The recent Asset quality review on non-performing loans conducted by the Bank of Italy: 
Main features and results. Available from: 
<http://www.bancaditalia.it/media/approfondimenti/documenti/Asset_quality_review.pdf?language_id=1>.  
[8 October 2015]. 
47
 Financial Services Agency June 2014, Inspection Manual for Deposit-Taking Institutions. Available from: 
<http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/manual/yokin_e/y-all.pdf>. [5 August 2015]. 
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Republic of 
Korea  
Under the asset classification rule, there are five classifications applicable 
to a bank loan: normal, precautionary, substandard, doubtful, and 
presumed loss. Loans classified as either substandard, doubtful, or 
presumed loss are collectively referred to as substandard or below loans 
(SBLs). The SBL classifications are influenced by forward-looking 
criteria (FLC), so a performing loan that currently generates interest 
income may be classified as an SBL if it is determined that the borrower’s 
debt-servicing ability has significantly deteriorated and has raised the risk 
of future default. In contrast, the primary determining factor an NPL 
classification is whether a loan currently generates interest payment, so a 
loan would not be classified as an NPL if it continues to generate interest 
income; this would be the case even if the borrower’s debt-serving ability 
has significantly deteriorated and the risk of default has heightened.  
The Bank of 
Korea
48
 
 
 
 
Mexico  
In order to reclassify the loan as non-performing, 90 days must go by after 
the end of the extension period. The delinquency rate is defined as the 
stock of non-performing loans divided by the stock of total loans. 
Banco de 
México
49
 
 
 
                                               
48
 The Bank of Korea 2015, pers. comm., 21 August. 
49
 Banco de México September 2013, Financial System Report. Available from:  
<http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/informes-periodicos/reporte 
sf/%7BCE284A71-335F-95DE-FE82-5C0A8239CF44%7D.pdf>. [25 August 2015]. 
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Russia  
There is no exact definition of “non-performing loan” under the Russian 
legal framework. (Bank of Russia Regulation No. 254-P, dated 26 March 
2004, ‘On the Procedure for Making Loss Provisions by Credit 
Institutions for Loans, Loan and Similar Debts’). The Bank of Russia 
shares an approach used in international practice, considering non-
performing loans as loans with overdue debt over 90 days. The Bank of 
Russia widely uses this term for assessment of credit risk in homogeneous 
loans portfolios, for example, of unsecured consumer loans. 
Simultaneously, such indicators of credit risk as a share of arears in total 
volume of outstanding loans and a share of problem and loss loans in total 
debt are also used to analyse banks credit portfolios quality. Arrears 
include debts not paid back on time, as stipulated by loan agreement. The 
loans quality categories (probability of impairment of a loan) are 
classified on the basis of professional judgment using combination of two 
classification criteria (the borrower’s financial position and the debt 
service quality). Collateral is not considered as a factor that influences the 
quality category of loans. Loans are classified (except for loans grouped 
in a portfolio of homogeneous loans) into one of five quality categories: 
(1) standard loans – no credit risk; (2) non-standard loans – moderate 
credit risk; (3) doubtful loans – considerable credit risk; (4) problem loans 
– high credit risk; and (5) loss loans – no possibility of loan repayment 
due to the borrower’s inability or refusal to meet loan commitments, 
which stipulates complete (100 per cent) impairment of the loan. Loans 
classified as non-standard loans and loss loans are impaired. The 
impairment loss is defined as the difference between the book value of a 
loan, i.e., the outstanding debt registered in accounting as of the time of 
its assessment and its fair value as of the time of assessment (the current 
value of a loan). 
Central Bank of 
the Russian 
Federation
50
 
  
 
                                               
50
 Central Bank of the Russian Federation 2015, pers. comm., 30 September. 
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Saudi Arabia  
Banks should be able to identify/differentiate defaulted exposures that fall 
within different categories of classified assets (i.e. Substandard, Doubtful 
and Loss). A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a 
particular obligor when either or both of the two following events have 
taken place: (1) a bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay in full 
its credit obligations to the bank (or the banking group of which it is a 
part), without recourse by the bank to actions such as realizing security (if 
held); (2) the obligor is past due for more than 90 days on any material 
portion of its credit obligations to the bank (or the banking group of which 
it is a part). Past due credit obligations are regarded as material if they 
represent 5% or more of the obligor’s outstanding credit obligations. 
Credit risk comprises the following loan classification: (1) impaired loans; 
(2) defaulted loans; (3) past due loans (less than 90 days, 90-100 days, 
180-360 days, over 360 days); and (4) allowances (specific allowances 
and general allowances). Impairment is an accounting term which is 
calculated by calculating the present value of future cash flows related to 
a particular loan and then comparing it to the carrying amount of the loan. 
While past due loan simply means a loan which has not been paid on time 
and is now overdue by certain days (which after 90 days falls in the 
definition of default). Performing loans are considered to be those that are 
not past due for more than 90 days in accordance with paragraph 75 of the 
Basel II framework. Conversely, non-performing loans are considered to 
be loans that are more than 90 days past due. 
Saudi Arabian 
Monetary 
Agency
51
 
 
 
 
                                               
51
 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency April 2008, Guidance On Application Procedures for Adoption of the IRB 
Approach by Banks Licensed in Saudi Arabia. Available from: <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/Laws/Documents/Section%20B/Guidelines%20on%20Application%20Procedures%20for%20the%20Adoption
%20of%20IRB%20Approaches%20by%20Bank%20licensed%20in%20Saudi.pdf#search=Guidance%20On%20Ap
plication%20Procedures>. [20 August 2015]. 
SAMAs Final Guidance document Concerning Implementation of Basel III Pillar 3 Component, December 2012. 
Available from: <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Laws/Documents/Section B/1. SAMAs Final Guidance 
document.zip>. [25 September 2015]. 
SAMA’s Guidance Document Concerning Basel III: the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Based on BCBS 
Document of October 2014. Available from:  
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/Laws/Documents/Section%20B/5.%20SAMAs%20Guidance%20Document%20concerning%20Basel%20III%2
0NSFR.pdf#search=SAMA%E2%80%99s%20Guidance%20Document%20Concerning%20Basel%20III:%20the%
20Net%20Stable%20Funding%20Ratio>. [25 September 2015]. 
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South Africa  
When an arrears loan remains on the books of the bank after the original 
maturity and the bank continues to collect outstanding amounts this will 
not be considered a restructure and should not be reported as such. The 
loan should be classified as non-performing in line with the bank’s credit 
and write-off policy. Loans which are in arrears (but not in default) and 
which are restructured should not be classified as performing until such 
time as the obligor’s ability to meet the requirements of the revised terms 
and conditions has been established. Credit risk exposures are classified 
as either “standard”, “special mention”, “substandard”, “doubtful” or 
“loss” by South African banks and reported on a quarterly basis. A 
financial asset is impaired and impairment losses are incurred only if there 
is objective evidence of impairment as a result of one or more events that 
have occurred after the initial recognition of the asset (a loss event) and 
that loss event has an impact on the estimated future cash flows of the 
financial asset, that can be estimated reliably. If there is objective 
evidence that an impairment loss has been incurred on loans and 
receivables the amount of the loss is measured as the difference between 
the asset’s carrying amount and the present value of estimated future cash 
flows discounted at the original effective interest rate of the financial 
asset. 
 
South African 
Reserve Bank
52
  
 
 
 
Turkey  
Loans extended to households and firms, which are currently less than 90-
days past due or do not have any repayment problem but for which there 
are estimations for a weakening repayment capability in the future, are 
classified as “loans under close monitoring”. If the delay in the repayment 
of loans under close monitoring exceeds 90 days or the belief that their 
collection will be problematic strengthens, these loans start being 
monitored under the NPL class. The Regulation on Procedures and 
Principles for Determination of Qualifications of Loans and other 
Receivables by Banks and Provisions to be Set Aside (Article 5) requires 
banks to categorize loans and receivables under 5 groups. Loans 
categorized in “Group 1- Standard” and “Group 2-Special mention” are 
performing loans. Loans classified in the remaining 3 categories are 
considered non-performing loans. Following are the criteria for those non-
performing categories. Group 3- Limited recovery: Past due between 91-
180 days or limited recovery expectation due to financing and liquidity 
problems of the debtor. Group 4- Suspicious recovery (doubtful): Past due 
between 181-365 days or substantial deterioration in the creditworthiness 
of debtor but not considered loss because of the partial recovery 
expectation. Group 5- Loss: Past due for over 365 days or no recovery 
expectation due to the significant deterioration in the creditworthiness of 
the debtor. 
 
Central Bank of 
the Republic of 
Turkey
53
 
 
 
                                               
52
 South African Reserve Bank 2014, Directive 9/2014 issued in terms of section 6(6) of the Banks Act (Act No. 94 
of 1990). Available from:  
<https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/6538/D9%20of%202014.pdf>. [25 
August 2015]. 
South African Reserve Bank 12 June 2014, Annual Report 2013/14. Available from: 
<https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/6292/Annual%20Report%202014.pd
f>. [5 December 2015]. 
53
 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 2015, pers. comm., 11 August. 
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United Kingdom  
The definition for forbearance should be taken from either: (1) the EBA 
consultation paper on Implementing Technical Standards on Supervisory 
Standards; (2) the FSA definition of forbearance as detailed in the 
published guidance. The PRA defines impairment charge as amount of 
impairment taken in the time period specified. Impairment charge is 
typically expressed as a positive number (i.e. a loss is represented by a 
positive figure). 
 
Prudential 
Regulation 
Authority 
(PRA)
54
 
 
United States  
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) requires creditors to 
measure a loan for impairment based on the fair value of the collateral 
when the creditor determines that foreclosure is probable. In addition, 
GAAP allows a creditor to measure an impaired loan on which the 
repayment of the loan is expected to be provided solely by the underlying 
collateral (i.e., a collateral-dependent loan) based on the fair value of the 
collateral. 
Securities and  
Exchange 
Commission
55
 
 
 
 
European Union  
A loan is classified as a non-performing exposure where the loan is 90 
days past-due or if there is a risk of unlikely repayment without 
realization of collateral. The definition applies regardless of the 
classification of a loan or debt security as impaired or defaulted, but a 
loan or a debt security that has been classified as impaired in the financial 
statements or that has been classified as defaulted in capital adequacy 
shall always be classified as a non-performing exposure according to 
EBA’s definition. This definition applies in parallel to the definitions 
reported in this table for those jurisdictions that are members of the 
European Union (France, Germany, Italy and UK). 
European Banking 
Authority (EBA)
56
 
 
 
 
Sources: The regulatory bodies’ websites (See References). 
  
                                               
54
 Prudential Regulation Authority January 2015, Retail Credit Risk Non-UK Portfolio Quality Return. Available 
from: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/foi/2015stresstests/st1.pdf.> [30 November 2015]. 
55
 Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance 20 April 2012, CF Disclosure Guidance: 
Topic No. 5. Staff Observations Regarding Disclosures of Smaller Financial Institutions. Available from:  
<https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic5.htm>. [1 December 2015]. 
56
 European Banking Authority July 2014, FINAL draft Implementing Technical Standards on Supervisory reporting 
on forbearance and non-performing exposures under article 99(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. Available from: 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/449824/EBA-ITS-2013 
03+Final+draft+ITS+on+Forbearance+and+Non-performing+exposures.pdf/a55b9933-be43-4cae-b872 
9184c90135b9>. [5 July 2015]. 
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Appendix 2 
Extracts from annual reports of NPL and impaired loans across G-SIBS 
 
Bank 
 
NPLs/Impaired loans definition 
 
Source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agricultural 
Bank of China 
Loans classified as substandard, doubtful and loss are regarded as non-
performing loans. Substandard loans: the borrowers’ ability to service 
their loans is in question and they cannot rely entirely on normal 
operating revenues to repay principal and interest. Losses may ensue 
even when collateral or guarantees are invoked. Doubtful loans: 
borrowers cannot repay principal and interest in full and significant 
losses will need to be recognized even when collateral or guarantees are 
invoked. Loss loans: only a small portion or none of the principal and 
interest can be recovered after taking all possible measures and 
exhausting all legal remedies. 
 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
57
  
 
 
Bank of 
America 
NPLs do not include past due consumer credit card loans, other 
unsecured loans and in general, consumer non-real estate-secured loans 
(loans discharged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy are included) as these loans 
are typically charged off no later than the end of the month in which the 
loan becomes 180 days past due. NPLs and accruing balances past due 
90 days or more do not include the Purchased Credit-impaired loan 
portfolio or loans accounted for under the fair value option even though 
the customer may be contractually past due. In addition, the Bank 
classifies junior-lien home equity loans as nonperforming when the first-
lien loan becomes 90 days past due even if the junior-lien loan is 
performing. A loan is considered impaired when, based on current 
information and events, it is probable that the Corporation will be unable 
to collect all amounts due, including principal and interest, in 
accordance with the contractual terms of the agreement, or the loan has 
been modified in a troubled debt restructuring. 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
58
 
 
 
Bank of China 
Identified impaired loans and advances are loans for which objective 
evidence of impairment exists and which have been identified as bearing 
an impairment loss and assessed either: (1) individually (including 
mainly significant corporate loans and advances over a certain amount 
which are impaired); or (2) collectively (portfolios of individually 
insignificant homogenous loans which share similar credit risk 
characteristics, including insignificant corporate loans and advances and 
personal loans which are impaired). 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
59
 
                                               
57
 Agricultural Bank of China 24 March 2015, 2014 Annual Results Announcement. Available 
from:<http://www.abchina.com/en/about-us/annual-report/201503/P020150326402006728756.pdf>. [3 December 
2015]. 
58
 Bank of America Corporation 11 March 2015, 2014 Annual Report. Available from: <http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/IROL/71/71595/AR2014.pdf>. [3 December 2015]. 
59
 Bank of China Limited 25 March 2015, 2014 Annual Report. Available from: 
<http://pic.bankofchina.com/bocappd/report/201504/P020150428619210434247.pdf >. [4 December 2015]. 
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Bank of New 
York Mellon 
Commercial loans are placed on nonaccrual status when principal or 
interest is past due 90 days or more, or when there is reasonable doubt 
that interest or principal will be collected. When a first lien residential 
mortgage loan reaches 90 days delinquent, it is subject to an impairment 
test and may be placed on nonaccrual status. At 180 days delinquent, the 
loan is subject to further impairment testing. The loan will remain on 
accrual status if the realizable value of the collateral exceeds the unpaid 
principal balance plus accrued interest. If the loan is impaired, a charge-
off is taken and the loan is placed on nonaccrual status. At 270 days 
delinquent, all first lien mortgages are placed on nonaccrual status. 
Second lien mortgages are automatically placed on nonaccrual status 
when they reach 90 days delinquent. 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
60
 
 
Barclays 
 
A loan is considered past due when the borrower has failed to make a 
payment when due under the terms of the loan contract. The impairment 
allowance includes allowances against financial assets that have been 
individually impaired and those subject to collective impairment. Loans 
that are past due but not impaired consist predominantly of wholesale 
loans that are past due but individually assessed as not being impaired. 
These loans, although unimpaired, may carry an unidentified 
impairment. Impaired loans that are individually assessed consist 
predominantly of wholesale loans that are past due and for which an 
individual allowance has been raised.  
 
Annual Report 
2014
61
 
 
 
BBVA 
The classification of financial assets impaired due to customer default is 
individualized to the following criteria: (1) the total amount of financial 
assets, whoever the holder and collateral, which have principal, interest 
or fees amounts past due for more than 90 days as contractually agreed 
following objective criteria through aging calculation systems, unless 
already charged off; and, (2) contingent risks where the third party 
collateral individual becomes impaired. The classification of financial 
assets impaired by reasons other than customer default is performed 
individually for all risks whose individual amount is material where 
there is reasonable doubt about their full repayment on contractually 
agreed terms as they show objective evidence of impairment adversely 
affected by the expected cash flows of the financial instrument. 
Impaired/doubtful/nonperforming portfolio are financial assets whose 
carrying amount is higher than their recoverable value, prompting the 
entity to recognize the corresponding impairment loss. NPLs are defined 
as the balance of non performing risks, whether for reasons of default by 
customers or for other reasons as detailed in section II of Annex IX of 
Bank of Spain Circular 04/2004, for exposures on balance loans to 
customers. 
 
Consolidated 
financial 
statements, 
management 
report and 
auditors’  
report 2014
62
 
                                               
60
 Bank of New York Mellon 27 February 2015, 2014 Annual Report. Available from: 
<https://www.bnymellon.com/_global-assets/pdf/investor-relations/annual-report-2014.pdf>. [3 December 2015]. 
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BNP Paribas 
Doubtful loans are defined as loans where the bank considers that there 
is a risk that the borrowers will be unable to honour all or part of their 
commitments. This is the case for all loans on which one or more 
instalments are more than three months overdue (six months in the case 
of real estate loans or loans to local governments), as well as loans for 
which legal procedures have been launched. When a loan is classified as 
doubtful, all other loans and commitments to the debtor are 
automatically assigned the same classification. 
 
2014 
Registration 
document 
and annual 
financial 
report
63
 
 
Citigroup Inc. 
As a general policy, residential first mortgages, home equity loans and 
installment loans are classified as non-accrual when loan payments are 
90 days contractually past due. Credit cards and unsecured revolving 
loans generally accrue interest until payments are 180 days past due. 
Home equity loans in regulated bank entities are classified as non-
accrual if the related residential first mortgage is 90 days or more past 
due. 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
64
 
 
Credit Suisse 
A loan is classified as non-performing no later than when the contractual 
payments of principal and/or interest are more than 90 days past due 
except for subprime residential loans which are classified as non-
performing no later than when the contractual payments of principal 
and/or interest are more than 120 days past due. The additional 30 days 
ensure that these loans are not incorrectly assessed as non-performing 
during the time when servicing of them typically is being transferred. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
65
 
 
 
Deutsche 
Bank 
A loan or group of loans is impaired and impairment losses are incurred 
if: (1) there is objective evidence of impairment as a result of a loss 
event that occurred after the initial recognition of the asset and up to the 
balance sheet date (“a loss event”); (2) the loss event had an impact on 
the estimated future cash flows of the financial asset or the group of 
financial assets; and, (3) a reliable estimate of the loss amount can be 
made. 
 
Annual 
Review 
2014
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Goldman 
Sachs 
The Bank provides a definition of impaired loans and loans on non-
accrual status. A loan is determined to be impaired when it is probable 
that the firm will not be able to collect all principal and interest due 
under the contractual terms of the loan. At that time, loans are placed on 
non-accrual status and all accrued but uncollected interest is reversed 
against interest income and interest subsequently collected is recognized 
on a cash basis to the extent the loan balance is deemed collectible. 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
67
 
 
Groupe BPCE  
Loans for which recovery is uncertain result in the recognition of an 
impairment loss on the asset to cover the risk of loss. Impairment losses 
are calculated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the present 
value of guarantees received. Impairment losses are determined on at 
least a quarterly basis and are calculated in reference to available 
guarantees and a risk analysis. Impairment losses cover at a minimum 
the interest not received on doubtful loans. Doubtful loans are identified 
in compliance with French Accounting Standards Authority (ANC) 
regulation No. 2014-07, particularly in the case of loans past due for 
over three months, over six months for real estate loans, and over nine 
months for loans to local authorities. Article 2221-1 para 1 of the 
regulation No. 2014-07 provides that ‘Sont des encours douteux, les 
encours porteurs d’un risque de crédit avéré au sens de l’article 2211-2c) 
du présent règlement, correspondant à l’une des situations suivantes: 
lorsqu’il existe un ou plusieurs impayés depuis trois mois au moins (six 
mois pour les créances sur des acquéreurs de logement et sur des 
preneurs de crédit-bail immobilier, neuf mois pour les créances sur des 
collectivités locales, compte tenu des caractéristiques particulières de 
ces crédits). Il ne peut être dérogé à cette règle que lorsque des 
circonstances particulières démontrent que les impayés sont dus à des 
causes non liées à la situation du débiteur’. 
 
2014 
Registration 
document and 
full-year 
financial 
report
68
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Group Crédit 
Agricole 
 
There is no identified credit risk on loans and receivables that are less 
than 90 days past due, accounting for 89.4% of past due but not 
impaired loans. In accordance with IAS 39, loans classified under Loans 
and receivables are impaired whenever there is objective indication of 
impairment as a result of one or more loss events occurring after the 
initial recognition of these loans, such as: (1) borrower in serious 
financial difficulties; (2) a breach of contract such as a default on the 
payment of interest or principal; (3) the granting by the lender to the 
borrower, for economic or legal reasons connected with the borrower’s 
financial difficulties, of a facility that the lender would not have 
envisaged under other circumstances (loan restructuring); and (4) 
increasing probability of bankruptcy or other financial restructuring of 
the borrower. 
 
Annual 
Financial 
Report 2014
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 Group Crédit Agricole 20 March 2015, Annual Financial Report 2014. Available from: <http://www.credit-
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2015]. 
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HSBC 
Impaired loans and advances are those that meet any of the following 
criteria: (1) wholesale loans and advances classified as Customer Risk 
Rating (‘CRR’) 9 or CRR 10. These grades are assigned when the bank 
considers that either the customer is unlikely to pay its credit obligations 
in full, without recourse to security, or when the customer is more than 
90 days on any material credit obligation to HSBC; (2) retail loans and 
advances classified as Expected Loss (‘EL’) 9 or EL 10. These grades 
are assigned to retail loans and advances greater than 90 days past due 
unless individually they have been assessed as not impaired; and, (3) 
renegotiated loans and advances that have been subject to a change in 
contractual cash flows as a result of a concession which the lender 
would not otherwise consider, and where it is probable that without the 
concession the borrower would be unable to meet the contractual 
payment obligations in full, unless the concession is insignificant and 
there are no other indicators of impairment. Renegotiated loans remain 
classified as impaired until there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a 
significant reduction in the risk of non-payment of future cash flows, 
and there are no other indicators of impairment. 
 
Annual Report 
and Accounts 
2014
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 HSBC Bank plc 23 February 2015, Annual Report and Accounts 2014. Available from: 
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Industrial and 
Commercial 
Bank of China 
Limited 
According to the regulatory requirement on loan risk classification, the 
Bank implemented five-category classification management in relation to 
loan quality and classified loans into five categories: (1) pass; (2) special 
mention; (3) substandard; (4) doubtful; and (5) loss, based on the 
possibility of collecting the principal and interest of loans. In order to 
implement sophisticated management of credit asset quality and improve 
risk management, the Bank implemented the 12-category internal 
classification system for corporate loans. The Bank applied five-category 
classification management to personal credit assets and ascertained the 
category of the loans based on the number of months for which the lender 
is in default, anticipated loss rate, credit rating, collaterals and other 
quantitative and qualitative factors. Impaired loans and advances are 
defined as those loans and advances having objective evidence of 
impairment as a result of one or more events that occured after initial 
recognition and that event has an impact on the estimated future cash 
flows of loans and advances that can be reliably estimated. These loans 
and advances include corporate loans and personal loans which are 
graded as “Substandard”, “Doubtful” or “Loss”.  
 
2014 Annual 
Report
71
 
 
ING Group 
A financial asset or a group of financial assets is impaired and 
impairment losses are incurred if, and only if, there is objective evidence 
of impairment as a result of one or more events that occurred after the 
initial recognition of the asset, but before the balance sheet date, (a ‘loss 
event’) and that loss event (or events) has an impact on the estimated 
future cash flows of the financial asset or group of financial assets that 
can be reliably estimated. All loans with past due financial obligations of 
more than 90 days are automatically reclassified as non-performing. For 
the commercial lending portfolios there are generally reasons for 
declaring a loan non-performing prior to being 90 days past due. These 
include, but are not limited to, ING Bank’s assessment of the customer’s 
perceived inability to meet its financial obligations, or the customer 
filing for bankruptcy or bankruptcy protection. ING Bank identifies as 
non-performing loans those loans for which it is probable, based on 
current information and events that the principal and interest amounts 
contractually due will not be collected in accordance with the 
contractual terms of the loan agreements. In line with the regulatory 
definition (CRR/CRDIV), ING Bank considers all business loans as 
non-performing if they are 90 days past due. In line with the IFRS, after 
a payment default of an obligor of more than 90 days, or the likelihood 
of a payment default of the customer, the particular loan and all other 
positions will be regarded as problem or non-performing loans. 
 
ING Group 
Annual Report 
2014
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JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. 
Loans (other than credit card loans and certain consumer loans insured 
by U.S. government agencies) are placed on nonaccrual status and 
considered nonperforming when full payment of principal and interest is 
in doubt, or when principal and interest has been in default for a period 
of 90 days or more, unless the loan is both well-secured and in the 
process of collection. A loan is determined to be past due when the 
minimum payment is not received from the borrower by the 
contractually specified due date or for certain loans (e.g., residential real 
estate loans), when a monthly payment is due and unpaid for 30 days or 
more. Impaired loans are loans measured at amortized cost, for which it 
is probable that the Firm will be unable to collect all amounts due, 
including principal and interest, according to the contractual terms of the 
agreement. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
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Mitsubishi UFJ 
FG 
Impaired loans primarily include nonaccrual loans and troubled debt 
restructurings. A loan is considered impaired when, based on current 
information and events, it is probable that we will be unable to collect all 
of the scheduled payments of interest on, and repayment of, the principal 
of the loan when due according to the contractual terms of the loan 
agreement. A loan is considered a nonaccrual loan when substantial 
doubt exists as to the full and timely payment of interest on or 
repayment of the principal of the loan. Substantially all nonaccrual loans 
are also impaired loans. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
74
 
 
Mizuho FG 
The Mizuho FG Group considers loans to be impaired when it is 
probable that the Group will be unable to collect all the scheduled 
payments of principal and interest when due according to the contractual 
terms of the loan. The Group classifies loans to special attention, 
intensive control, substantially bankrupt and bankrupt obligors as 
impaired loans. Impaired loans include loans past due for 90 days or 
more and restructured loans that meet the definition of troubled debt 
restructuring in accordance with ASC 310 “Receivables” of the FASB 
Accounting Standards Codification. ASC 310-10 provides general 
guidance for receivables and notes that receivables arise from credit 
sales, loans, or other transactions. All of the Group’s impaired loans are 
designated as nonaccrual loans. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
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Morgan 
Stanley 
Loans classified as Doubtful or Loss are considered impaired. When a 
loan is impaired the impairment is measured based on the present value 
of expected future cash flows discounted at the loan’s effective interest 
rate or, as a practical expedient, the observable market price of the loan 
or the fair value of the collateral if the loan is collateral dependent. The 
Company places loans on nonaccrual status if principal or interest is past 
due for a period of 90 days or more or payment of principal or interest is 
in doubt unless the obligation is well-secured and in the process of 
collection. Loans classified as Doubtful or Loss are categorized as 
nonaccrual. 
 
2014 Annual 
Report on 
Form 10-K
76
 
 
Nordea 
A provision is recognized if there is objective evidence based on loss 
events and observable data that the customer’s future cash flow is 
weakened to the extent that full repayment is unlikely, collateral 
included. Exposures with provisions are considered as impaired. 
Exposures that have been past due more than 90 days are by definition 
regarded as non-performing, and reported as impaired or not impaired 
depending on the deemed loss potential. 
 
 
Annual Report 
2014
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Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
Loans are all loans (including loans subject to forbearance) for which an 
impairment provision has been established; for collectively assessed 
loans, impairment loss provisions are not allocated to individual loans 
and the entire portfolio is included in impaired loans. Accruing loans 
past due 90 days or more comprise loans past due 90 days where no 
impairment loss is expected. Non-performing loans are loans classified 
as Risk elements in lending and potential problem loans. They have a 
100% probability of default. 
 
Annual Report 
and Accounts 
2014
78
 
                                               
76
 Morgan Stanley 2 March 2015, 2014 Annual Report on Form 10-K. Available from: 
<http://www.morganstanley.com/about-us-ir/pdf/2014_MS_10-K_Final_Clean_Bannerless.pdf>. [4 December 
2015]. 
77
 Nordea Bank 5 February 2015, Annual Report 2014. Available from: <http://www.nordea.com/Images/33-
36843/2014-01-01_Annual-Report-2014-Nordea-Bank-AB_EN.pdf>. [4 December 2015]. 
78
 Royal Bank of Scotland 25 February 2015, Annual Report and Accounts 2014. Available from: 
<http://investors.rbs.com/~/media/Files/R/RBS-IR/2014-reports/annual-report-2014.pdf>. [4 December 2015]. 
 
 
Staff Working Paper No. 594 April 2016 
 
76 
 
Santander 
Loans and advances are classified as non-performing typically when the 
counterparty fails to make payments when contractually due for three 
months or longer, although there can be additional qualifying criteria 
depending upon the business segment and product. Under Santander 
UK’s definition of a NPL, in line with the criteria set by the Bank of 
Spain and Grupo Santander, NPL is classified as doubtful when: (1) 
clients with payment delays of between 30 and 90 days and who have 
been declared publically insolvent (via bankruptcy process) in the 
previous two years; (2) operations in which once the maturity date is 
reached there is still capital of the loan pending payment with a maturity 
of more than 90 days, although the client remains up to date with the 
monthly payments; and (3) forbearance operations which, in accordance 
with the corporate policy, are considered as “payment agreements” and 
thus classified as doubtful. Forbearance refers for the purposes of the 
Group’s risk management to operations which the client has presented, 
or financial difficulties are envisaged for meeting payment obligations in 
the prevailing contractual terms and, for this reason, steps were taken to 
modify, cancel or even formalise a new transaction. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
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Société 
Générale 
When a borrower’s solvency is such that after the loan has been 
classified as doubtful for a reasonable period, it is not foreseeable that it 
will be reclassified as a performing loan, the loan is identified as a non-
performing loan. A loan is classified as non-performing once the bank 
asks for an early termination, when the contract is terminated and in any 
case one year after it was classified as doubtful, except where the 
original terms of the contract have been respected or where the loan is 
covered by guarantees which ensure its recovery. Loans which have 
been restructured and for which the borrower has not respected the new 
conditions are also classified as non-performing. Any loan is classified 
as doubtful if one or more repayments are more than three months 
overdue (six months for mortgage loans and nine months for loans to 
local authorities), or, regardless of whether any payments have been 
missed, if it can be assumed that there is an identified risk, or if legal 
proceedings have been started. 
 
Annual 
Financial 
Report 2014
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Standard 
Chartered 
An NPL is any loan that is more than 90 days past due or is otherwise 
individually impaired. This excludes loans renegotiated at or after 90 
days past due, but on which there has been no default in interest or 
principal payments for more than 180 days since renegotiation, and 
against which no loss of principal is expected. These loans may have a 
provision reflecting the time value of money, and, if so, are reported as 
part of forborne loans. Loans are classified as impaired where individual 
identified impairment provisions have been raised and also include loans 
that are collateralised or where indebtedness has already been written 
down to the expected realisable value. The impaired loan category may 
include loans that, while impaired, are still performing. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
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State Street 
Loans are placed on non-accrual status once principal or interest 
payments are 60 days contractually past due, or earlier if management 
determines that full collection is not probable. Loans 60 days past due, 
but considered both well-secured and in the process of collection, may 
be excluded from non-accrual status. 
 
 
 
 
2014 Annual 
Report to 
Shareholders
82
 
 
Sumitomo 
Mitsui FG 
Impaired loans and advances are comprised of “potentially bankrupt, 
effectively bankrupt and bankrupt (loans and advances),” “past due three 
months or more (loans),” “restructured (loans)” and “other impaired 
(loans and advances).” “Potentially bankrupt, effectively bankrupt and 
bankrupt (loans and advances)” comprises loans and advances to the 
borrowers that are perceived to have a high risk of falling into 
bankruptcy, may not have been legally or formally declared bankrupt 
but are essentially bankrupt, or have been legally or formally declared 
bankrupt. Loans classified as “past due three months or more (loans)” 
represent those loans that are three months or more past due as to 
principal or interest, other than those loans to borrowers who are 
potentially bankrupt, effectively bankrupt and bankrupt. In particular, 
“Bankrupt loans” are loans, after write-off, to legally bankrupt 
borrowers as defined in Article 96-1-3 and 96-1-4 of “Order for 
Enforcement of the Corporation Tax Act” (Cabinet Order No. 97 of 
1965) and on which accrued interest income is not recognized as there is 
substantial doubt about the ultimate collectability of either principal or 
interest because they are past due for a considerable period of time or for 
other reasons. “Non-accrual loans” are loans on which accrued interest 
income is not recognized, excluding “Bankrupt loans” and loans on 
which interest payments are deferred in order to support the borrowers’ 
recovery from financial difficulties. 
 
 
2015Annual 
Report
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UBS 
A loan is classified as non-performing when the payment of interest, 
principal or fees is overdue by more than 90 days, when insolvency 
proceedings have commenced, or when obligations have been 
restructured on preferential terms. Loans are evaluated individually for 
impairment when amounts have been overdue by more than 90 days, or 
if other objective evidence indicates that a loan may be impaired. 
 
Annual Report 
2014
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Unicredit 
Group 
Non-performing loans are formally impaired loans, being exposure to 
insolvent borrowers, even if the insolvency has not been recognized in a 
court of law, or borrowers in a similar situation. Measurement is 
generally on a loan-by-loan basis (coverage ratios statistically and 
automatically determined for some loan portfolios below a predefined 
threshold are also checked), for loans singularly not significant, on a 
portfolio basis for homogeneous categories of loans. Past-due impaired 
loans are defined as total exposure to any borrower not included in the 
other categories, which at the balance sheet date has expired facilities or 
unauthorized overdrafts that are more than 90 days past due and meet 
the requirements set out by supervisory regulations for their 
classification under the “past due exposures” category (TSA banks) or 
under the “defaulted exposures” category (IRB banks). 
 
2014 
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Wells Fargo 
Loans are placed on nonaccrual status when: (1) the full and timely 
collection of interest or principal becomes uncertain (generally based on 
an assessment of the borrower’s financial condition and the adequacy of 
collateral, if any); (2) they are 90 days (120 days with respect to real 
estate 1-4 family first and junior lien mortgages which are not mortgage 
loans or consumer loans exempt under regulatory rules from being 
classified as nonaccrual until later delinquency) past due for interest or 
principal, unless both well-secured and in the process of collection; (3) 
part of the principal balance has been charged off (including loans 
discharged in bankruptcy); (4) for junior lien mortgages, there is 
evidence that the related first lien mortgage may be 120 days past due or 
in the process of foreclosure regardless of the junior lien delinquency 
status; and (5) performing consumer loans are discharged in bankruptcy, 
regardless of their delinquency status. For real estate 1-4 family first and 
junior lien mortgages, the Bank calculates fair value by discounting 
contractual cash flows, adjusted for prepayment and credit loss 
estimates, using discount rates based on current industry pricing (where 
readily available) or its own estimate of an appropriate discount rate for 
loans of similar size, type, remaining maturity and repricing 
characteristics. 
 
2014 Annual 
Report
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Source: Various bank annual reports, bank websites and existing databases (e.g. Bankscope). 
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